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Abstract
Three collections of data are presented in this thesis, with the broad aim of investigating
a potential role for theory protection in human associative learning. According to theory
protection,  people  should  resist  updating  their  existing  knowledge  (i.e.  resist  new
learning), even when faced with evidence that contradicts what they already know. In
other  words,  people should maintain established associations between environmental
cues and outcomes wherever possible. Theory protection differs from typical prediction
error accounts of learning (e.g.  Bush & Mosteller,  1951; Rescorla & Wagner,  1972;
Rescorla, 2001). According to prediction error accounts, people should update existing
associations  (i.e.  learn)  most  readily  when  the  outcomes  they  encounter  are  most
discrepant  with  what  they  predict.  Details  about  these  accounts  are  introduced  in
Chapter  1,  along with  several  other  theories  and phenomena that  are  central  to  the
subsequent  chapters. In  the  first  set  of  experiments  (reported  in  Chapter  2),  human
participants were initially trained with a set of cues, each of which was followed by the
presence or absence of an outcome. In a subsequent training stage, two of these cues
were trained together, and the amount learned about each of the cues was compared,
using a procedure based on Rescorla (2001). In each experiment, the cues differed in
both their prediction error (with respect to the outcome), and the confidence participants
should  have  about  their  causal  status.  The cue  with  the  larger  prediction  error  was
always the cue with lower confidence about its causal status. In an apparent violation of
prediction  error,  participants  always  learned  more  about  the  cue  with  the  smaller
prediction  error,  supporting  a  theory  protection  account  of  learning.  Participants
appeared to protect their existing beliefs about cues with a known causal status, instead
attributing unexpected outcomes to cues with a comparatively ambiguous causal status.
The second set of experiments (reported in Chapter 3) provides further  evidence of
theory protection, except that the cues, outcomes and experimental scenario differed to
those in the Chapter 2 experiments. Chapter 3 also includes direct testing of the theory
protection  account  against  the  predictions  of  both  Pearce  and  Hall’s  (1980),  and
Mackintosh’s (1975) attentional accounts of learning. The results were not consistent
with either attentional theory. The final set of data (reported in Chapter 4) includes the
results  of  formal  model  fitting  simulations.  The findings  illustrate  a  simple  way of
representing participants’ lack of confidence about the causal status of novel cues. This
was  achieved  by  allowing  the  initial  strength  of  associations  (between  cues  and
outcomes) to be an intermediate value. Importantly, the best fitting initial associative
strength was shown to change in line with the overall proportion of trials on which the
outcome occurs. Free and open resources to support formal modelling in associative
learning  are  briefly  introduced.  Chapter  5  provides  a  general  discussion  of  all  the
findings,  whilst  also setting out  a  future programme of  research,  so that  the theory
protection account can be developed into a formal model of human associative learning.
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1: General Introduction
The primary aim of the research reported in this thesis was the investigation of theory
protection in human associative learning. Associative learning refers to the formation of
of mental links between phenomena in the environment. This includes rats learning that
specific behaviours will result in a reward (e.g. Skinner, 1938), or humans learning that
certain people are associated with either positive or negative attributes. In the context of
this  thesis, these associations are specific to learning about causation (i.e. a specific
event  causing  a  specific  outcome).  Theory  protection  encapsulates  the  notion  that
people resist updating established beliefs, even when faced with contradictory evidence.
Once such beliefs have been learned, people should protect them as much as possible,
changing their views in the most minimally available way (e.g. Harman, 1986). Beliefs
are conceptually rather a broad area, but in the context of this thesis, they specifically
refer to knowledge about the causal status of environmental phenomena, with respect to
associated  outcomes.  For  example,  you might  hold  a  belief  that  eating  eggs  causes
stomach ache.
In several of the experiments reported in this thesis, people appeared to protect their
beliefs,  when  faced  with  seemingly  contradictory  evidence.  The  experimental
participants  instead  attributed  the  occurrence  of  this  unexpected  evidence  to  other
readily available causes. Specifically, participants protected their beliefs about stimuli
with a known causal status,  instead attributing an unexpected event to stimuli about
which  no strong beliefs  were  held.  Of course,  protecting beliefs  and attributing the
occurrence of unexpected evidence elsewhere is by no means a phenomenon unique to
these  experiments.  This  type  of  process  has  been  demonstrated  in  research  into
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prejudice and attribution error (e.g. Hewstone, 1990; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002),
where positive behaviour by members of an outgroup is attributed to chance factors,
rather than being attributed to the inherent characteristics of that outgroup itself. These
attributions allow a negative opinion of outgroups to  be maintained,  contributing to
prejudice and bias. 
In the context of associative learning, theory protection should prevent new learning
from occurring, once associations have been formed. More informally, theory protection
represents the idea that people are somewhat stubborn and rigid in their beliefs, once
they have learned about something. Theory protection contrasts with the established
notion that learning is governed by prediction error (e.g. Rescorla, 2001). Prediction
error is a formal way of representing the discrepancy between what is expected and
what occurs, when an event is unexpected or surprising. According to prediction error
accounts of learning, people should learn the most when what they expect contrasts
most with what they experience. Consequently, a larger prediction error should result in
a larger updating of existing beliefs. To illustrate how these processes operate, and how
they differ, imagine that you have been enjoying a long running box-set TV show on
your  favourite  streaming  service.  Over  the  course  of  the  show,  the  quality  of  the
episodes has been extraordinarily high, and you have therefore learned to associate this
show with excellent quality writing, acting and directing. Let us assume that the first
episode of the latest season airs. As a consequence of the high quality of the preceding
seasons,  you  should  predict  that  this  episode  will  also  be  of  a  very  high  quality.
However, contrary to what you predict, the first episode in fact turns out to be appalling.
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According to a prediction error account, there will be a large discrepancy between what
you predict (i.e. excellent quality) and what actually occurs (i.e. terrible quality). This
large  prediction  error  should  drive  a  large  amount  of  learning.  Consequently,  your
expectations  about  the  rest  of  the  season  should  be  considerably  poorer.  However,
according to theory protection, you should resist updating your expectations about the
rest of the season, particularly if there are other factors to which you can attribute the
poor quality of the first episode. For example, the first episode could simply be setting
the pieces in place for a fantastic final run of episodes, rather than being concerned with
telling  a  quality  story  in  itself.  Alternatively,  the  disappointing  first  episode  could
simply be an uncharacteristic wobble in quality that is unlikely to be repeated. After
viewing this first episode, your expectations for the rest of the season should remain
relatively unchanged and you should anticipate that higher quality episodes will follow. 
However, as more episodes of the season air, they also turn out to be terrible. According
to a prediction error account, there should be less learning as the season progresses, as
you will already predict a poorer quality set of episodes. There will no longer be a large
prediction error to drive learning, so there will be less scope for any new updating of
your beliefs.  However,  according to theory protection,  you should continue to resist
updating your expectations about the rest of the season, desperately holding on to the
hope of some brilliant quality TV that the writers will pull out of the bag before the
season finale. Eventually, of course, the weight of evidence will become too great and
you will be forced to accept the overwhelming reality of the situation. However, you
may continue to look for factors to which you can attribute the failure of this now-
tarnished show, into which you have invested so many of your precious hours. 
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Theory protection and prediction error and both involve more complex processes than
this illustrative example, but the important point is that these differing accounts can lead
to different learning outcomes in certain situations. Consequently, these processes can
be tested against each other,  with the goal of understanding which one is the better
account  of  human  associative  learning.  Whilst  this  was  the  overriding  goal  of  the
current  research,  a  further  goal  was  to  modify  existing  formal  models  of  human
associative learning, in a way that allows for people’s uncertainty about the causal status
of  novel  cues  to  be  mathematically  represented.  Over  the  course  of  this  brief
introductory chapter, theory protection and prediction error are unpacked in more detail.
Some  of  the  complexities  alluded  to  above  are  also  discussed  in  the  subsequent
chapters. Additionally, this chapter incorporates a brief summary of what else will be
covered in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Prediction error is a core component of many influential models of associative learning
(e.g. Bush & Mosteller, 1951; Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). As briefly
outlined above, such theories state that learning occurs when humans and non-human
animals encounter surprising outcomes (or events). There are many scenarios in which
prediction error is proposed to govern learning. These scenarios will necessarily involve
some kind of discrepancy (i.e. error) between a predicted outcome and an experienced
outcome. To give another example, if you expect that a certain medication (i.e. cue) will
result in the side effect of a headache (i.e. outcome), but no headache occurs, then there
will be a large error between what you predicted and what occurred. Consequently, your
expectations about that medication will change and your future predictions of headache
after consumption of the medication will be reduced. Eventually, after further use of this
medication, you will be able to accurately predict that it is safe to use. Alternatively, if a
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person expects that a type of food is safe to eat, but they experience an allergic reaction
after eating that food, then learning will take place and expectations about that food will
update accordingly. Since learning is proportional to prediction error, learning ceases
once the prediction error is eliminated. At this point, learning is said to have reached
asymptote.  Much  of  the  research  supporting  prediction  error  as  a  determinant  of
learning  stems  from  non-human  animal  conditioning  research  (e.g.  Pavlov,  1927;
Kamin, 1969; Rescorla, 2001). All other things being equal, a larger prediction error
should always result in greater learning. 
Evidence for learning being proportional to prediction error is well established and has a
long  history.  One  of  the  clearest  demonstrations  of  this  relationship  comes  from
“learning curves”, where the reduction in learning rate, as prediction error reduces, can
be plotted as a decelerating curve. For example, rats might be experimentally trained
that pressing a lever results in the reward of a food pellet. As they learn, their delay
before pressing the lever will reduce over time. However these reductions in time will
become incrementally smaller until there is no further reduction. This type of learning is
known  as  acquisition,  and  the  plottable  curve  is  known  as  an  acquisition  curve.
Similarly, if the lever press ceases to result in a reward, the rats will also learn about
this. This type of learning is known as extinction. A plottable extinction curve will be
produced,  as  the  delay  before  pressing  the  lever  increases;  rapidly  at  first,  before
slowing and settling at a level representing chance. Demonstrations of acquisition and
extinction curves can be seen in examples such as Skinner (1938), Graham and Gagne
(1940), Guttman (1953), and Lewis (1956). 
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In a study with rats  and pigeons,  Rescorla (2001) demonstrated a greater change in
responding (signifying greater learning) for cues with a larger prediction error. In one
experiment rats were shown two cues (e.g. a light and a sound) simultaneously (i.e. in a
compound).  Both of these cues were already familiar  to the rats.  One of these cues
(which will be referred to as cue A) previously resulted in the occurrence of an outcome
(e.g. a food pellet), while the other cue (which will be referred to as cue B) resulted in
the absence of this outcome (e.g. no food pellet). If + and – are used to represent the
presence  or  absence  of  the  outcome,  respectively,  then  the  rats  experienced  A+ B-
training prior to experiencing the compound of these cues. When the rats subsequently
experienced this compound, the outcome was absent (AB-). The results indicated that
the rats  learned more about A, supporting a prediction error account.  However,  this
seems at odds with what one might expect in human causal learning. During A+ trials
participants would presumably form a belief that A causes the outcome. On the other
hand,  B  should  be  somewhat  ambiguous  after  B-  training  because  there  is  no
information available to indicate whether B is neutral or preventative (i.e. inhibitory),
with  respect  to  the  outcome.  To  produce  a  result  that  is  analogous  to  Rescorla’s,
participants would need to change their existing beliefs about A rather than attributing a
surprising  outcome  to  B,  which  is  ambiguous.  Perhaps  a  more  intuitive  prediction
would be for human participants to maintain their belief (i.e. protect their theory) about
the causal status of A, and instead attribute the absence of the outcome (during the AB-
trials)  to  B,  resulting in  more learning about  B.  If  true,  this  would run contrary  to
Rescorla’s proposal. 
In order to explain how theory protection and a prediction error account can be tested
against  each  other,  there  is  a  little  more  complexity  to  Rescorla’s  theoretical  and
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methodological  approach  that  needs  to  be  discussed.  Importantly,  not  all  kinds  of
prediction error are the same. According to Bush and Mosteller’s (1951) theory, learning
about each cue is determined by the discrepancy between the outcome that occurs and
the  outcome that  was predicted  by that  cue  alone.  This  is  referred  to  as  individual
prediction error. However, following the observation that knowledge about one cue can
interfere with learning about another (e.g. the blocking effect, Kamin, 1969), Rescorla
and Wagner (1972) suggested that learning was instead governed by overall prediction
error;  that  is,  the  discrepancy  between  the  outcome  that  occurs  and  an  aggregate
prediction derived from all the cues that are present. It is not necessary to know the
equations for these two prediction error models for the majority of this thesis, but they
are  included  in  the  introduction  to  Chapter  4  (4.1).  Subsequently,  Rescorla  (2001)
provided evidence that learning is governed by a mixture of individual prediction error
and overall prediction error. In other words, when more than one cue is present, learning
can be greater (but not smaller) for those cues whose individual causal status is most
discrepant from the outcome. It is also necessary to explain the rest of the design of the
Rescorla (2001) rat experiment described above, so that the design of the experiments in
Chapters 2-3 make sense. In this experiment, the rats were initially trained with two
excitatory (i.e. followed by the outcome) cues A+ and C+, and two non-reinforced (i.e.
not  followed  by  the  outcome)  cues  B-  and  D-.  After  the  completion  of  this  initial
training, the rats were then trained with a non-reinforced compound (AB-) containing
one  previously  encountered  excitatory  cue  A,  and  one  previously  encountered  non-
reinforced cue B. Following this, the amount learned about A and B on the AB- trials
was compared using a compound testing procedure in which compounds AD and BC
were presented. 
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This compound testing procedure provides a way of comparing the amount of learning
for two cues that are trained from different starting associative strengths (i.e. strength of
the association between a cue and an outcome). This is required because the relationship
between associative strength and responding is not necessarily linear (Gluck & Bower,
1988), which makes it difficult to assess the amount of learning for individual cues. For
example, an increase in associative strength from 0 to 0.5 (where 1 is the maximum
value) would not necessarily translate into a change in responding from 0 to 5 on an 11-
point  response  scale  (where  10  is  the  maximum  value),  in  the  case  of  a  human
experiment.  This  same  issue  also  applies  to  the  kind  of  responses  that  non-human
animals, such as rats, make in learning experiments. The change in responding could be
either  proportionally  larger  or  proportionally  smaller  than  the  change in  associative
strength. In other words, rather than a 1:1 linear relationship, associative strength could
instead map onto responding via a logistic function. However, as one value increases,
the  other  value should  also  increase.  Therefore,  it  would never  be the  case  that  an
increase in associative strength should result in a decrease in responding. Rescorla’s
experiments  circumvented  the  issue  of  non-linear  mapping  by using  the  above  test
compounds that each contained a cue that had previously been paired with the outcome
(A or  C)  alongside  a  cue  that  had  previously  been  paired  with  the  absence  of  the
outcome  (B  or  D).  Hence,  in  the  absence  of  the  second  (AB-)  stage,  both  test
compounds would have resulted in equal responding. Any difference in responding to
these  compounds  during  the  test  must  therefore  have  been  the  consequence  of
differences in learning about A and B on the AB- trials. 
In the above (Rescorla, 2001) design, individual prediction error would lead to more
learning about  A during  the compound training stage,  since the  outcome it  predicts
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following the initial training (A+) is the most discrepant with the outcome that occurs
during  the  compound  stage  (AB-).  Overall  prediction  error  would  result  in  equal
learning about cues A and B, because they effectively ‘share’ their prediction error. This
means  that  cues  presented  together  account  for  an  equal  share  in  any  change  in
associative strength that occurs from learning. The results showed less responding to the
compound AD than BC, suggesting a greater decrease in associative strength for cue A
than cue B. These results were taken by Rescorla to be evidence of individual prediction
error. Had learning been solely based on overall prediction error, there would have been
no difference in responding to the compounds at test.  Rescorla’s (2001) proposal of a
mixture  of  individual  and  overall  prediction  error  was  subsequently  challenged  by
Holmes, Chan and Westbrook (2019), who showed that overall prediction error alone
can  account  for  these  findings  if  the  function  mapping  associative  strength  to
responding is appropriately modified. As already outlined, the logic of this is that a non-
linear mapping function allows equal changes in associative strength to result in unequal
changes  in  responding,  as  well  as  unequal  summation  of  individual  cues  into
compounds.
In the case of humans, if participants protect their theory about A being a cause of the
outcome  during  the  AB-  trials,  the  opposite  result  to  Rescorla  (2001)  should  be
observed.  This  is  because  more  should  be  learned  about  B,  leading  to  reduced
responding  (e.g.  lower  causal  ratings  being  assigned  at  test)  to  the  BC compound.
Participants should learn that B is preventative of the outcome, meaning that it would
prevent C from causing the outcome. Even a modified response function (Holmes et al.,
2019) should not permit such a finding under a prediction error account, since a cue
with a smaller prediction error should not be learned about more than a cue with a larger
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prediction error, assuming both cues are equally salient. In the case of two cues being
trained in compound, the idea that the cue undergoing a larger change in associative
strength would result in the smaller change in responding seems implausible. However,
the view that human participants might maintain existing associations, in spite of a large
prediction error, does seem plausible. In fact, such a view is consistent with theoretical
approaches  seen  in  other  cognitive  fields.  For  example,  the  suggestion  that  humans
should  resist  updating  their  beliefs  has  parallels  with  theories  about  schemata  (e.g.
Bartlett,  1932),  in  terms  of  humans  accommodating  new  information  into  existing
frameworks. Also, the processing of new cue-outcome associations, in a manner that fits
with existing causal associations, is comparable to confirmation bias (Wason, 1960).
Additionally, attribution of an unexpected outcome to one cue, without beliefs about
other  cues needing to be updated,  could be considered efficient in  a manner  that  is
similar to the concept of the cognitive miser (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). This latter concept
in itself has obvious parallels with the minimalist updating of views (Harman, 1986).
mentioned at  the start  of this  chapter.  It  is  worth briefly  noting that this  minimalist
approach has been challenged by Walsh and Johnson-Laird (2009), who found evidence
that some beliefs do not always update in the most informationally minimalist  way.
However, this updating of beliefs was based on participants explaining contradictory
evidence thorough the use of disabling conditions. According to this process, learned
beliefs (e.g. the striking of a match will cause it to light) are still protected, if exceptions
to this  can be attributed to disabling conditions (e.g.  the match being soaking wet).
Furthermore, such disabling conditions are themselves based on learned theories and
beliefs about how things operate in our everyday environments, meaning that existing
frameworks of beliefs are still  maintained. Despite the influence of these theoretical
approaches in fields such as decision making, there is currently no formal theory of
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associative  learning  that  implements  this  kind  of  process.  A possible  reason  is  the
apparent lack of an obvious variable to govern learning. However, confidence about the
causal status of cues provides one promising candidate. Specifically, if participants are
more  confident  about  the  causal  status  of  a  cue,  they  should  be  more  resistant  to
updating their beliefs (i.e. greater theory protection), resulting in less learning.
Whist there is no formal theory of associative learning that implements confidence in
the manner described above, there are some phenomena and theories that encompass
similar ideas. For example, latent inhibition (Lubow, 1973) is a phenomena concerning
cues  that  have  previously  been  encountered,  without  causing  an  outcome.  If  these
previously encountered cues are subsequently trained as causing a specific outcome,
they are learned about more slowly than novel cues that are given equivalent training.
One common explanation of latent inhibition is that differences in the attention paid to
cues, on the basis of their familiarity, alters the rate of learning (Mackintosh, 1975). In
the  case  of  humans,  this  phenomena  could  also  be  explained  in  terms  of  theory
protection. If a cue has been demonstrated not to cause an outcome, then this belief
would need to be updated, once it is subsequently trained with that outcome.  However,
latent inhibition has also been demonstrated in non-human animals.  It could be that
differing mechanisms produce equivalent effects in different species, but it may also be
that this is not a demonstration of theory protection in humans. 
Latent  inhibition  differs  from  standard  inhibition  (also  referred  to  as  conditioned
inhibition). As briefly mentioned above, inhibition is learning that a specific cue (i.e. an
inhibitor) is preventative of an outcome. For example a certain medication may actively
prevent an allergic reaction from being caused by a type of food. Inhibition can be
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tested for, using retardation of acquisition, in which a trained inhibitor and an excitatory
cue are placed in a test compound. Reduced responding to this test compound provides
evidence of the inhibitor preventing the outcome from being caused by the excitatory
cue (e.g.  Rescorla,  1971). Inhibition is  relevant to the Rescorla (2001) experimental
design, if applied to humans (and also to the experiments presented in Chapter 3). The
A+ AB- design described earlier is known as a (type of) feature negative discrimination.
There is evidence from rat experiments that cue B can acquire inhibitory control over
subsequent  responding,  when  tested  with  different  excitatory  cues  (e.g.  Holland  &
Coldwell,  1993).  Initially,  this  might  seem  contradictory,  given  than  Rescorla
demonstrated that rats learn more about A. However, simple discriminations (without a
compound design) do not allow for a comparison of the amount learned about cues A
and B during the AB- trials. Even if A remains excitatory and B becomes inhibitory, this
does not mean that B is learned about more than A. Rescorla’s (2001) results support
this notion. Inhibition is considered in greater detail in Chapter 3.
It is also worth briefly discussing theory protection in terms of context. Returning to the
example of extinction, participants should initially resist altering what they have already
learned about a cue. For example, if a specific food has been learned as causing stomach
ache, and is subsequently trained as not causing stomach ache, participants should 
protect their belief that this food causes stomach ache. In the A+  AB- example, there is 
another readily available cue, to which the unexpected absence of the outcome can be 
attributed, allowing beliefs about the excitatory cue to be protected. However, another 
cue might not always be available. There is evidence that context plays an important 
role in such circumstances. Extinction appears to be context specific in non-human 
animals (e.g. Bouton, 1994; Bouton & Todd, 2014). For example, if a cue is learned as 
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an excitor in context 1 and then extinguished in context 2, the extinguished responding 
will return if that animal is placed back in context 1. Similarly, if a cue is both learned 
about and extinguished in context 1, the extinguished responding will return if the 
animal is placed in context 2. This type of context-dependent “renewal” has also been 
demonstrated with cues learned as inhibitors (Bouton & Todd, 2014). This process is 
comparable to the concept of theory protection in humans, in that an association is 
maintained (i.e. renews after extinction) in spite of new information being learned. 
However, the research cited above was conducted with non-human animals (e.g. rats). 
Given the Rescorla (2001) results, it is unlikely that theory protection is governing this 
process in rats. Bouton and Todd (2014) outline a plausible explanation, in which 
context can either have a direct effect on responding (i.e. through an inhibitory 
association between context and responding), or become associated with a cue-outcome 
association (i.e. an association with an association). 
In the case of humans, context could still provide a way of explaining an unexpected 
outcome and protecting a theory. For example, if you expect that a certain type of food 
is safe to eat, but you experience an allergic reaction while eating at a new restaurant, 
you might protect your belief that the food is safe to eat, and attribute the allergic 
reaction to the context of being in that restaurant (e.g. because of poor hygiene 
standards). Of course, this could also be explained in terms of the restaurant itself 
becoming associated with the occurrence of stomach ache, in a manner comparable to 
rats. Context-based renewal effects have been demonstrated in humans (e.g. Balooch & 
Neumann, 2011). At the time of writing this thesis, it was not clear how theory 
protection could be adequately tested against other explanations, in terms of context. 
Therefore, context is not investigated experimentally in the reported experiments. 
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Nevertheless, this does raise some interesting questions in terms of human learning and 
context. For example, would extinction occur more rapidly in a different context to 
excitatory training, compared to the same context (i.e. assuming that a different context 
could be used by participants to explain the absence of an outcome). There is also the 
question of whether a different pattern of results would be seen in rats.
In terms of existing models that have some similarity to theory protection, Pearce and 
Hall (1980) proposed an attentional model that does incorporate uncertainty (i.e. a lack 
of confidence), as a process that facilitates greater learning. Their model proposes that 
less learning occurs for cues that reliably predict outcomes. However, according to 
Pearce and Hall, learning is governed by the surprisingness of outcomes, while the 
concept of theory protection suggests that learning is governed by people’s certainty 
about the causal status of cues. The Pearce and Hall model is considered in more detail 
later in this thesis, in relation to the experimental findings, and the difference between 
these approaches is unpacked further. Theory protection is also comparable to Bayesian 
models of associative learning (e.g. Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006; Kruschke, 
2008), in terms of being belief-focused. Such models represent beliefs about cues, in 
relation to differing hypotheses about what they might do. These beliefs are based on 
the likelihood of an outcome being caused by specific cues. Outcome likelihood varies 
according to experience (i.e. training), and Bayesian associative learning models weight 
values of likelihood according to the associative history of cues. However, rather than 
having a specific associative strength value, the status of cues is represented on a belief 
(i.e. probability) distribution, in which some associative strengths are more likely than 
others (e.g. it might be more likely that a cue causes stomach ache than not, or vice 
versa). One such Bayesian model, the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960), has been 
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developed into a Bayesian equivalent of the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model (e.g. 
see Kruschke, 2008), in which the predicted outcome is expressed as a distribution of 
beliefs across all possible outcome values. Similar to the Rescorla-Wagner model, this 
value is still based on an aggregate of the outcome predicted by all cues on a specific 
training trial, although this model is more flexible in its predictions, as it is not using 
fixed associative strength values. Confidence (or rather a lack of it) also plays a role in 
Bayesian inference, in that uncertainty about beliefs facilitates greater learning. 
Uncertainty is triggered by surprising outcomes (similar to Pearce and Hall, 1980). 
Again, this differs from theory protection, where a lack of confidence stems from the 
causal status of cues, on the basis of their ambiguity. It should be emphasised that 
Bayesian associative learning models are a broad approach, rather than a single specific 
theory that can be tested against theory protection. However, a Bayesian approach could
be a route into formally implementing a theory protection-type process. 
In the absence of a formal theory of causal confidence and associative learning, the 
starting point of the project reported in this thesis was the proposal of a simple theory 
protection account, for cases in which two cues are trained in compound. According to 
this account, human participants should engage in theory protection, by showing little or
no learning about the cue that they are most confident about, while showing greater 
learning for the cue that they are least confident about (e.g. because its causal status is 
ambiguous in some way). The rationale for the experiments in Chapters 2-3 was the 
testable prediction that greater confidence about the causal status of cues, should lead to
reduced learning. In other words, if participants are confident about the causal status of 
a cue, then they should protect this theory, rather than updating the causal status of that 
cue through subsequent learning. By extension, if participants are not confident about 
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the causal status of a cue, this lack of a strong theory should facilitate learning. It is 
possible to test this account against a simple prediction error account (i.e. individual 
prediction error, overall prediction error, or a mixture of both), by training two cues that 
are known to differ in their causal confidence (from the perspective of participants) in a 
compound, in order to compare the amount of learning for each cue. 
All of the experiments reported in Chapters 2-3 were designed to test a prediction error
account (e.g. Rescorla, 2001) against the theory protection account. These experiments
utilised  Rescorla’s  compound  testing  procedure  (Rescorla,  2000;  2001)  so  that
differences in learning about cues could be assessed. In each experiment, following an
initial training stage, two cues were trained in compound, and the amount of learning for
each cue was compared. The two cues always differed in terms of the size of their
prediction error and how confident participants should be about their status. In all seven
experiments, the expectation was that there would be less learning about the cue with
the larger prediction error, since participants should protect their theory about that cue,
on the basis of being more confident about its causal status. The experiments in Chapter
2  were  based  on a  cue  competition  phenomenon called  the  redundancy effect  (e.g.
Uengoer, Lotz, & Pearce, 2013), while the experiments in Chapter 3 were based on the
above Rescorla (2001) design. Furthermore, several of the Chapter 3 experiments were
also designed to test attentional accounts, such as Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce and
Hall (1980) against the theory protection account. In the final experiment, participants
gave ratings of confidence about the causal status of cues, proving further support for
the theory protection account. The experiments in Chapter 4 focused on a separate issue;
uncertainty about the causal status of novel cues. The experimental data collected were
used for a series of computational model fitting procedures, in order to find an adequate
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formally implemented account of those data. However, the issues discussed in Chapter 4
link back to the issues discussed in Chapters 2-3. Chapter 5 considers the theoretical
implications of all the research reported in this thesis. 
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2.1: Theory Protection 1
The experiments reported in Chapter 2 (and those reported in Chapter 4) are based on
cue competition effects in associative learning. Such effects occur when the presence of
one cue interferes with the learning about another cue. Blocking (Kamin, 1969) is the
most widely known type of cue competition. It occurs when learning about a cue is
apparently restricted by the simultaneous presence of another cue that has also been
trained separately. For example, if a single cue is followed by an outcome (A+) , and a
separately-encountered compound containing that cue is followed by the same outcome
(AX+), then learning about X is restricted. In humans, learning is often tested by asking
participants to rate the likelihood of the outcome, on the basis of specific cues (e.g.
Jones, Zaksaite, & Mitchell, 2019). Participants rate blocked cues as a less likely cause
of the outcome than an appropriate control (e.g. Y following B- BY+ training). There is
more than one type of blocking. For example, in forward blocking, trials containing the
separately  trained cue are  presented  before the  trails  containing the  compound (e.g.
Shanks, 1985). Experiment 8 in Chapter 4 uses this kind of blocking. In simultaneous
blocking,  the  trials  containing  the  separately  trained  cue  and  those  containing  the
compound are intermixed (e.g. Jones et al., 2019). Experiments 1 and 3 in this chapter
use  that  kind  of  blocking.  Overshadowing  (Pavlov,  1927) is  another  type  of  cue
competition. It is similar to blocking, in that learning is apparently restricted by the
simultaneous presence of  another  cue,  except  that  cue is  not  trained separately.  For
example, if a compound is followed by an outcome (AX+) but neither of those cues is
encountered separately, then both cues will overshadow each other. Test ratings for both
A and X should be lower than an appropriate control (e.g. K+), but also higher than for
a blocked cue. Experiment 2 in this chapter uses overshadowing.
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The aim of the first experiment reported in Chapter 2 was to pit the theory protection
account (as proposed in this thesis) against a prediction error account (e.g. Rescorla,
2001). To achieve this, cues were chosen that had specific properties. Firstly, one cue
needed  to  have  a  more  ambiguous  causal  status  than  the  other,  so  that  the  theory
protection  account  would  predict  greater  learning  for  the  more  ambiguous  cue.
Secondly, the cue with the least ambiguous causal status needed to be judged as a less
likely cause of the outcome prior to the compound conditioning phase.  This was to
ensure that a prediction error account would predict greater learning for this cue, when
the compound was trained as a cause of the outcome. Two cues with these properties are
found in the redundancy effect (e.g. Uengoer et al., 2013). 
A typical redundancy effect design involves presenting participants with a training stage
incorporating blocking (A+ AX+) and a simple discrimination (BY+ CY-). Cue Y, from
the simple discrimination, is referred to as an uncorrelated cue, because it appears in
both  a  causal  compound and a non-causal  compound.  The redundancy effect  is  the
robust finding that X is rated as a more likely cause of the outcome than Y during a
subsequent test  phase (Jones & Zaksaite, 2018; Jones et al.,  2019; Uengoer,  Dwyer,
Koenig,  & Pearce,  2019;  for  analogous results  in  non-human animals,  see Jones  &
Pearce, 2015; Pearce, Dopson, Haselgrove, & Esber, 2012). Crucially, there is evidence
from Jones et al. (2019) that participants’ confidence about the causal status of X and Y
differs at test. Participants were asked to make confidence ratings during the test stage
of  a  redundancy effect  experiment,  in  addition  to  outcome likelihood  ratings.  After
participants had rated the likelihood of the outcome for specific cues, they were asked to
rate  how  confident  they  were  about  their  likelihood  ratings.  The  mean  confidence
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ratings for the blocked cue (X) were significantly lower than those for the uncorrelated
cue (Y), suggesting that participants were less confident about the causal status of X
than Y. A further experiment by Jones et al. (2019) showed that the likelihood ratings of
blocked cues, but not uncorrelated cues, were dependent on the overall proportion of
training trials on which the outcome occurred. The results showed higher ratings when
the proportion of trials on which the outcome occurred was higher. This suggests that
participants’ beliefs about X were more labile than for Y, further supporting the idea that
participants are less confident about the causal status of blocked cues than uncorrelated
cues. 
It is worth noting that this theoretical view, in which participants are unconfident (i.e.
uncertain) about the causal status of blocked cues, is established within the learning
literature. For example, uncertainty about the causal status of blocked cues is supported
by  several  studies  investigating  the  effects  of  manipulating  assumptions  about  the
outcome  (e.g.  Lovibond,  Been,  Mitchell,  Bouton,  &  Frohardt  2003;  Beckers,  De
Houwer, Pineno, & Miller, 2005; Vandorpe, De Houwer, & Beckers, 2007). In terms of
the likelihood ratings provided by participants, cue X is typically assigned ratings in the
middle  of  an  11-point  likelihood  scale,  while  Y is  given  lower  likelihood  ratings,
suggesting that participants learn that Y is unlikely to be a cause of the outcome. On the
basis of the aforementioned confidence data, the intermediate likelihood ratings given to
X support  the  view that  participants  are  unconfident  about  the  status  of  X,  despite
encountering it in a causal compound (AX+). In other words, participants might give
such  intermediate  likelihood  ratings  when they  are  uncertain  because  they  lack  the
confidence  to  assign  either  a  high  or  a  low rating.  Nevertheless,  this  difference  in
likelihood  ratings  suggests  that,  if  X  and  Y were  combined  in  a  subsequent  XY+
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training phase, greater learning for Y than for X would be consistent with a prediction
error account.
Three experiments are reported in this chapter. In each one, following an initial training
stage, a blocked (or overshadowed) cue was trained in compound with an uncorrelated
(or negative discriminator) cue. The compound was always followed by presence of the
outcome. The cue with the larger prediction error at the start of the compound training
phase was always the cue about which participants should hold a stronger theory. This
allowed a direct comparison of the theory protection account against a prediction error
account,  since  these  theories  make  opposing  predictions  in  each  of  the  reported
experiments.
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2.2: Experiment 1
As with previous redundancy effect studies using human participants (e.g. Uengoer et
al., 2013), this experiment used a food allergy scenario. Participants were required to
learn whether an allergic reaction would occur, on the basis of different single foods or
pairs of foods being eaten. They were presented with a fictional scenario, in which they
played the role of a medical doctor, trying to ascertain which foods cause a stomach
ache in a test patient. During the training trials, participants were presented with a series
of  food  cues  and  were  asked  to  predict  whether  or  not  the  fictional  patient  would
experience  a  stomach  ache  after  eating  these  foods.  After  participants  made  their
prediction, they were then provided with feedback as to whether or not a stomach ache
occurred.  Following  training,  participants  were  tested  by  being  asked  to  make  a
likelihood rating indicating how likely they thought a stomach ache would be after the
patient ate specific foods.
The design of the experiment is shown in Table 1. This design contained two blocked
cues (W and X) and two uncorrelated cues (Y and Z). Following this training phase, one
blocked  cue  and  one  uncorrelated  cue  were  trained  together  and  paired  with  the
outcome (XY+). If learning in this phase is the result of individual prediction error, in a
similar manner to Rescorla (2001), there should be more learning about Y than X as it
will have the greater error at the start of the XY+ stage. This is because uncorrelated
cues are given lower likelihood ratings than blocked cues, so this lower rating is the
most discrepant with the outcome when XY+ is presented. Alternatively, if learning is
determined by overall prediction error, there should be equal learning about X and Y.
Finally,  if  learning is  determined by the theory protection account,  then participants
should protect their theory about Y since they have already learned that it is not a cause
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of the  outcome with relative confidence (Jones  et  al.,  2019).  However,  they  should
readily  attribute  the  outcome  to  the  causally  ambiguous  X  during  XY+  trials.
Consequently, X should be learned about more than Y. 
Table 1. The design of Experiments 1-3
Experiment Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
1 A+  AX+  BY+  CY-
D+  DW+  EZ+  FZ-
XY+ XZ  WY
A  B  C  D  E  F  X  Y  W  Z
2 AX+  BY+  CY-
DW+  EZ+  FZ-
XY+ XZ  WY
A  B  C  D  E  F  X  Y  W  Z
3 A+  AX+  BY+  CY-
D+  DW+  EZ+  FZ-
XC+ XF  WC
A  B  C  D  E  F  X  Y  W  Z
Key:
Letters A-F = different cues
+ = stomach ache
- = no stomach ache
Learning about X and Y was compared using a final discrimination of a similar kind to
that used by Rescorla (2001). As well as being asked for likelihood ratings for each
individual cue, participants were asked to rate the likelihood of the outcome for two
compounds, XZ and WY. Each of these compounds contained one cue that had been
blocked in Stage 1, and one that had been an uncorrelated cue in Stage 1. In the absence
of  Stage  2  training,  these  two  compounds  should  be  assigned  the  same  likelihood
ratings at test. Consequently, any difference between these compounds must necessarily
be the result of the XY+ training in Stage 2, and would indicate a different amount of
learning about  X and Y during that  stage.  Therefore,  if  learning is  governed by an
individual prediction error term, participants should rate the likelihood of the outcome
as being higher for WY than XZ. If learning is governed by an overall error term, then
there should either be no difference between ratings of XZ and WY, or a higher rating
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for WY if a modified response function (i.e. Holmes et al., 2019) is assumed. However,
if learning is determined by the theory protection account, then XZ should be assigned
higher ratings than WY at test. 
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2.2.2: Method
Participants
Thirty-six psychology students from the University  of  Plymouth participated in  this
experiment, in return for course credit (30 female, 6 male; mean age = 20.2, SD = 3.1).
This sample size has adequate power to detect medium-sized within-subjects effects
(83% power at d = 0.5). People who had previously taken part in similar experiments
were excluded from this study, to ensure participants were naive to the purpose of the
experiment.
Materials
Participants were all tested in the same lab at University of Plymouth. The experiment
was  conducted  using  Viglen  Genie  desktop  computers,  running  the  Windows  10
operating  system.  The  computers  all  used  22-inch  Phillips  LED  displays,  with
participants at  a typical  distance (of approximately 40-80 cm) from the screen.  The
experiment  was designed and executed in  the Psychopy desktop application version
1.83.04  (Peirce,  2007),  with  the  output  generated  as  individual  CSV files  for  each
participant.  Participants  made  their  responses  by  pressing  keys  on  a  standard  UK
computer keyboard during the training stages, and by using mouse clicks during the test
stage. The ten individual cue types were represented on screen as photographs of fruits:
apple, banana, cherry, kiwi, mango, orange, peach, pear, plum and strawberry. All the
fruits were presented within a white square. The dimensions of each cue (including the
white square) were 300 x 300 pixels, with a screen resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels. For
each participant, the foods were randomly assigned to each cue (A, B, C, D, E, F, X, Y,
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W and Z). The two outcomes, ‘stomach ache’ and ‘no stomach ache’, were represented
by text on screen and a photograph of a man clutching his stomach, or a man giving a
‘thumbs up’, respectively. The outcome images were presented within a white rectangle.
The dimensions of the outcome images (including the white rectangle) were 291 x 332
pixels. All experimental text, including instructions, was white. A black background was
used throughout the experiment. Study information sheets, consent forms and debrief
forms were all printed on paper.
Design
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 1. During Stage 1,
participants were presented with twelve blocks of training. The eight trial types (A+,
AX+, BY+, CY-, D+, DW+, EZ+, FZ-) appeared in a random order within each block.
Each trial type was only presented once within each block. There were six trials in Stage
2, all with XY+. During the Test stage, participants were presented with two blocks of
test cues. The twelve trial types (A, B, C, D, E, F, X, Y, W, Z, XZ and WY) appeared in
a random order within each block. Each trial type was only presented once within each
block. 
 
Procedure
Participants were required to read an information sheet and sign a consent form prior to
participating in the experiment.  The experimental instructions were presented on the
screen at the start of the experiment. They were adapted from Uengoer et al. (2013) and
were as follows:
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This study is concerned with the way in which people learn about relationships between
events. In the present case, you should learn whether the consumption of certain foods
leads to stomach ache or not.
Imagine  that  you  are  a  medical  doctor.  One  of  your  patients  often  suffers  from a
stomach ache after eating. To identify which foods they react to, the patient eats specific
foods and observes whether a stomach ache occurs or not. The results of these tests are
shown to you on the screen one after the other. 
You  will  always  be  told  what  your  patient  has  eaten.  Sometimes,  they  have  only
consumed a single kind of food and on other times they have consumed two different
foods. Please look at the foods carefully.
You will then be asked to predict whether the patient suffers from stomach ache. For
this prediction, please click on the appropriate response button. After you have made
your  prediction,  you  will  be  informed  whether  your  patient  actually  suffered  from
stomach ache. Use this feedback to find out what foods cause a stomach ache in your
patient. At first you will have to guess the outcome because you do not know anything
about your patient. But eventually you will learn which foods lead to stomach ache in
this patient and you will be able to make correct predictions.
For all of your answers, accuracy rather than speed is essential. Please do not take any
notes during the experiment. If you have any more questions, please ask them now. If
you do not have any questions, please start the experiment by pressing the space bar.
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For each trial during the training stages, the cues were presented visually on either the
left- or right-hand side of the screen. When only one image was presented, the opposite
side of the screen contained a blank space. The cues were randomly assigned to either
the left or right position on each trial.  Text at the top of the screen stated that ‘The
patient  eats  the  following:’,  with  the  stimuli  presented  below  this.  Underneath  the
stimuli, further text stated ‘Which outcome do you expect? Please use your keyboard to
respond’. Participants were instructed to respond by pressing the appropriate key on
their keyboard; Z for ‘No Stomach Ache’ and M for ‘Stomach Ache’. After participants
made  their  response,  the  feedback  for  that  trial  was  shown.  The  feedback  screen
consisted  of  the  appropriate  outcome  image  along  with  its  accompanying  text,
indicating either ‘Stomach Ache’ or ‘No Stomach Ache’. The feedback was shown on
screen for two seconds, after which the next trial began. 
After the completion of Stage 1, Stage 2 started with no trial break so that from the
perspective of participants this was a seamless continuation of the training. This stage
consisted of a previously unseen compound XY presented six times in a row. As in
Stage 1, the cues were randomised on each trial to appear on either the left- or right-
hand side of the screen. The on-screen text and responding via the keyboard was the
same as in Stage 1. The process for displaying the trial feedback was also the same,
except that all six trials resulted in ‘Stomach Ache’ as the outcome. 
After  the  completion  of  Stage  2,  a  further  instruction  screen  was  shown  before
commencement of the Test stage:
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Next, your task is to judge the probability with which specific foods cause stomach ache
in your patient. Single foods and pairs of foods will be shown to you on the screen. In
this part of the experiment, you will receive no feedback about the actual reaction of the
patient. Use the information that you have collected so far, to make your rating. Press
the space bar to continue the experiment.
For each trial during the Test stage, the cues were presented on either the left- or right-
hand side of the screen. When only one image was presented, the opposite side of the
screen again contained a blank space. The cues were randomly assigned to either the left
or right position on each trial. As before, text at the top of the screen stated that ‘The
patient  eats  the  following:’,  with  the  stimuli  presented  below  this.  Underneath  the
stimuli, further text stated ‘How likely are they to suffer a stomach ache? (0 = Very
Unlikely; 10 = Very Likely)’. Participants were instructed to respond by clicking on an
eleven-point rating scale using their mouse pointer, to indicate how likely they thought
the occurrence of a stomach ache would be. The rating scale was located in the lower
part  of  the  screen,  with  the  11-point  scale  running from left  to  right,  in  ascending
numerical order. After participants made their response, a black screen appeared for 0.4
secs,  after  which  the  next  trial  was  presented.  Following  the  completion  of  the
experiment, participants were provided with a debrief form. 
Analysis
The data were processed and analysed using R (R Core Team, 2018). The difference
between the XZ and WY test  compounds was assessed using paired-samples t-tests.
Some additional analyses were also conducted on key single test  stimuli,  to test  for
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specific predicted differences between cue ratings. The alpha level was set to p < .05 for
all tests. As these tests were done on the basis of specific prior predictions, there was no
requirement for Bonferroni corrections. Bayesian t-tests were also conducted, using the
procedure recommended by Dienes (2011) and implemented as R code by Baguley and
Kaye (2010). As there was no suitable previous study on which to specify a plausible
predicted effect size, a uniform distribution was specified, with a lower limit of -5 and
an upper limit of 5 (in terms of the mean difference between ratings). The motivation
for this was that previous human experiments utilising this compound testing procedure
(e.g.  Mitchell,  Harris,  Westbrook,  & Griffiths,  2008)  produced  mean  differences  in
compounds  lower  than  5  (where  5  would  be  considered  a  reasonable  limit  to  any
observed  difference  when  an  11-point  rating  scale  is  used).  For  Bayesian  t-tests
conducted on single cues, the lower limit was set to -10 and the upper limit was set to
10, since these are the largest mean differences in either direction permitted by an 11-
point scale. In keeping with accepted conventions (e.g. Jeffreys, 1961), a Bayes factor
of over three was set as the level providing evidence for a difference, while a Bayes
factor of less than one third was set as the level providing evidence for no difference.
Values between these levels were accepted as being inconclusive.
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2.2.3: Results and Discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/4xbkp/. The descriptive statistics for the Experiment 1 training stages are
shown in Figure 1. The Stage 1 data indicate that participants learned sufficiently about
the eight different trial types by the time first training stage was complete. Similarly, the
Stage 2 data indicate that participants learned that the XY+ compound was causal by the
end of the second training stage, after giving it an intermediate rating on the first trial.
Figure 1. Experiment 1 Stage 1 and 2 data.
Descriptive statistics for the Experiment 1 Test stage are shown in Figure 2. Ratings for
XZ were significantly higher than for WY; t(35) = 2.99, p = .005, BF = 15.62, d = .50.
Further testing revealed higher ratings for the single cue X compared to W; t(35) = 3.96,
p < .001, BF = 215.66, d = .66. Conversely, there was no difference between the ratings
assigned to Y and Z; t(35) = 0.53, p = .597, BF = .08, d = .09, and therefore no evidence
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that participants learned about Y during the second stage of the experiment. Taken as a
whole,  these  findings  show  that  the  differences  between  the  compounds  were
specifically driven by learning about X during XY+ trials. Figure 2 panel B shows inter-
subject variability on the key compound test difference. As would be expected from the
mean test ratings, most individual participants rated XZ higher than WY, although the
variability did extend to some participants assigning a higher rating to WY. These data
are  consistent  with  the  theory  protection  account,  as  opposed  to  a  prediction  error
account (Rescorla, 2001). Despite the theoretical implications of this result, the crucial
next step was to ensure its generality. Experiment 2 was intended as an extension of
Experiment 1, to increase the generality of the findings. The design of Experiment 2
was modified, to vary the type of causally ambiguous cue incorporated into the design.
Figure 2. Experiment 1 Test stage ratings for all single stimuli and the two compound
cues.  Panel  B shows inter-subject  variability  on the key XZ-WY difference using a
method comparable to Hintze & Nelson (1998). Each dot is one participant, with jitter
applied for readability. The boxplot shows the median and interquartile range.
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2.3: Experiment 2
There were two key aims for Experiment 2. The first was to extend the generality of the
findings  of  Experiment  1  by  using  a  different  kind  of  causally  ambiguous  cue.  To
achieve  this,  the  experimental  design  was  modified  so  that  it  incorporated  an
overshadowed cue  (cf.  Waldmann,  2001) from a  two-item compound,  rather  than  a
blocked cue. As stated in the chapter introduction (2.1), overshadowed cues are similar
to blocked cues, in that two cues are trained in compound, but neither cue is presented
separately.  The  logic  was  that,  like  blocked  cues,  overshadowed  cues  are  causally
ambiguous from the perspective of the participant.  This is supported by Jones et al.
(2019), who reported that participants were less certain about their causal judgements of
overshadowed cues than of uncorrelated cues. Presumably this is because, when two
cues are  presented in compound and the outcome is  present (e.g.  AX+, without A+
training), participants do not know which of the two cues is the cause of the outcome.
However, unlike blocked cues, compound trials containing a pair of overshadowed cues
do at least allow participants to infer that at least one, or both, of the cues must be a
cause  of  the  outcome.  Accordingly,  Jones  et  al.  observed  higher  causal  ratings  for
overshadowed cues than for blocked cues.  Learning during Stage 2 should again be
greater  for  X  (the  overshadowed  cue)  rather  than  Y,  because  of  the  difference  in
confidence participants should have, in their theory about these two cues. However, the
higher causal ratings given to overshadowed cues, compared to blocked cues, meant that
there was a theoretical basis for expecting less learning during the XY+ stage, since
there was less discrepancy to be accounted for.
The  design  of  the  experiment  is  shown  in  Table  1.  All  details  were  identical  to
Experiment 1, except that the A+ and D+ trials were omitted from Stage 1. Following
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Experiment 1, the expectation was that causal ratings during the Test stage would again
be  higher  for  XZ than for  WY. However,  on the basis  of  the higher  causal  ratings
reported  by  Jones  et  al.  (2019)  for  overshadowed  cues  than  for  blocked  cues,  the
expectation  was  that  the  size  of  this  effect  would  be  somewhat  smaller  than  in
Experiment 1.
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2.3.2: Method
Participants
Forty participants were recruited from the University of Plymouth, in return for a small
monetary payment (32 female, 8 male; mean age = 26.7, SD = 10.4). This sample size
has adequate power to detect medium-sized within-subjects effects (87% power at d =
0.5). People who had previously taken part in similar experiments were excluded from
this study, to ensure participants were naive to the purpose of the experiment.
Materials
The materials used for Experiment 2 were the same as those used for Experiment 1,
except that Psychopy version 1.85.1 was used (Peirce, 2007).
Design
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 1. During Stage 1,
participants were presented with twelve blocks of training. The six trial types (AX+,
BY+, CY-, DW+, EZ+, FZ-) appeared in a random order within each block. Each trial
type was only presented once within each block. Stage 2 and the Test stage were exactly
the same as in Experiment 1.
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Procedure and analysis
The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as for Experiment 1. The analyses were
the same, except that the Bayesian priors were updated on the basis of the results of
Experiment  1.  As  outlined  above,  there  was  a  theoretical  basis  for  expecting  the
Experiment 2 mean differences to be smaller than the values observed in Experiment 1
(because  of  the  higher  ratings  given  to  overshadowed  cues  than  blocked  cues).
Therefore,  following  the  recommendations  of  Dienes  (2011),  a  half-normal  prior
distribution was specified for each Bayesian t-test, with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation set to the mean differences observed in Experiment 1.
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2.3.3: Results and discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/8ceub/. The descriptive statistics for the Experiment 2 training stages are
shown in Figure 3. The Stage 1 data indicate that participants learned sufficiently about
the six different trial types by the time first training stage was complete. Similarly, the
Stage 2 data indicate that participants learned that the XY+ compound was causal by the
end of the second training stage. 
Figure 3. Experiment 2 Stage 1 and 2 training data.
The descriptive statistics for the Test stage are displayed in Figure 4. Ratings for XZ
were significantly higher than for WY; t(39) = 2.37, p = .023, BF = 6.42, d = .37. This
finding supports the prediction that the compound containing X would receive higher
ratings. The difference between the compounds was again reflected in higher ratings for
X compared to W; t(39) = 2.37, p = .023, BF = 4.6, d = .38. There was no evidence for a
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significant  difference between Y and Z,  despite  the ratings  for Y appearing slightly
lower;  t(39) = 1.57,  p = .124,  BF = 1.13,  d = .25. As with Experiment 1, this finding
supports the theory protection account, rather than a prediction error account (Rescorla,
2001). Although the ratings for W appeared to be slightly higher than for A or D, there
was no evidence for a significant difference between either A and W,  t(39) = 1.17,  p
= .249, BF = .58, d = .19; or D and W, t(39) = 1.72, p = .093, BF = 1.09, d = .27. 
Figure 4. Experiment 2 Test stage ratings for all single stimuli and the two compound
cues. Panel B is a plot showing inter-subject variability on the key XZ-WY difference.
The results of Experiment 2 are consistent with those from Experiment 1; in both cases,
participants learned more about the cue about which they should have held a weaker
theory, as opposed to the cue that should have had the greater prediction error, when the
two cues were trained in compound. However, one limitation of these experiments is
that the number of trials featuring the two critical cues during Stage 1 was not matched.
Cue Y was presented to participants twice as often as X, because it was included in both
BY+ and CY- trials. This might be important because, according to some theories of
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attention (e.g. Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980), learning rate is influenced by
the amount of prior exposure to each cue. Another limitation is that the causal status of
Y could be considered somewhat ambiguous, since its occurrence during Stage 1 was
followed equally often by stomach ache and no stomach ache. Accordingly, Rescorla
and Wagner’s  (1972) model  predicts  that  Y will  maintain  some associative strength
during the first stage of Experiment 1. It does so because C is predicted to become an
inhibitor for the outcome, protecting Y from extinction on CY- trials. In fact, Rescorla
and Wagner’s model predicts that Y should have more associative strength than X in
many circumstances. Although the opposite result has been observed numerous times
(e.g. Uengoer et al., 2013), this is a reason to treat assumptions about the causal status
of Y with caution. In Experiment 3 these issues were addressed by comparing learning
about a blocked cue with learning about a different cue (about which participants would
be expected to hold a confident theory); one that was presented the same number of
times as the blocked cue, and that was never presented with the outcome during Stage 1.
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2.4: Experiment 3
The design of Experiment 3 is shown in Table 1. Having extended the generality of the
findings  of  Experiment  1  by  comparing  learning  about  Y  to  a  different  causally
ambiguous cue in Experiment 2, the next objective was to check that the effect would
persist if a different causally non-ambiguous cue was used in Stage 2. Training during
Stage 1 was the same as for Experiment 1, but Stage 2 differed in Experiment 3, in that
participants received XC+ training. The inclusion of C in this compound was motivated
by the high confidence ratings observed by Jones et al. (2019) for this cue compared to
X, indicating that participants have a stronger theory about the causal status of C. It was
also motivated by an assumption that the prediction error for C on the CX+ trials would
be large. Evidence for the latter assumption is provided by the consistently low causal
ratings assigned to C in previous experiments (Experiments 1 and 2, and all experiments
reported by Jones et al., 2019; and Uengoer et al., 2013), and the fact that C was always
presented  without  the  outcome  during  Stage  1.  The  Test  stage  contained  two
compounds,  XF  and  WC,  that  permitted  a  comparison  of  learning  about  X  and  C
according to the same logic as the previous experiments. If learning is determined by
individual prediction error, participants should learn more about C than X during Stage
2, and causal ratings should be higher for the WC compound than for the XF compound
during the Test stage (or no difference for overall  prediction error). Alternatively,  if
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 learned most about X during Stage 2 because of
their  lack  of  a  theory  about  its  causal  status,  then  that  effect  should  persist  in
Experiment 3, leading to higher causal ratings for XF than for WC at test.
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2.4.2: Method
Participants
Forty  Psychology  students  from  the  University  of  Plymouth  participated  in  this
experiment, in return for course credit (37 female, 3 male; mean age = 22.6, SD = 7.0).
This sample size has adequate power to detect medium-sized within-subjects effects
(87% power at d = 0.5). People who had previously taken part in similar experiments
were excluded from this study, to ensure participants were naive to the purpose of the
experiment.
Materials
The materials used for Experiment 3 were the same as those used for Experiments 1 and
2, except that Psychopy version 1.85.2 was used (Peirce, 2007).
Design 
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 1. During Stage 1,
participants were presented with twelve blocks of training. The eight trial types (A+,
AX+, BY+, CY-, D+, DW+, EZ+, FZ-) appeared in a random order within each block.
Each trial type was only presented once within each block. There were six trials in Stage
2, all with XC+. During the Test stage, participants were presented with two blocks of
test cues. The twelve trial types (A, B, C, D, E, F, X, Y, W, Z, XF and WC) appeared in
a random order within each block. Each trial type was only presented once within each
block. 
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Procedure and analysis
The procedure for Experiment 3 was the same as for Experiments 1 and 2. The analyses
were the same, except that the Bayesian priors were updated on the basis of the results
of Experiment 1. There was a theoretical basis for expecting the Experiment 3 mean
differences to be about the same as the values observed in Experiment 1, in that the
abstract design of the first training stage was the same. Therefore, following Dienes
(2011), a normal distribution was specified as the prior for each Bayesian t-test, with
each mean set to the corresponding Experiment 1 mean and each standard deviation set
to half this value.
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2.4.3: Results and discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/jqrb6/. The descriptive statistics for the Experiment 3 training stages are
shown in Figure 5. The data from Stage 1 indicate that participants learned sufficiently
about the eight different trial types by the time training was complete. Similarly, the
data from Stage 2 shows that participants learned that the XC+ compound was causal by
the end of that stage, after giving it an intermediate rating on the first trial.
Figure 5. Experiment 3 Stage 1 and 2 data.
Descriptive statistics for the Test stage are displayed in Figure 6. Causal ratings were
significantly higher for XF than for WC; t(39) = 2.39, p = .022, BF = 6.66, d = .38. This
finding supports the prediction that the compound containing X would be rated higher at
test. As expected, the difference between the compounds was driven by higher ratings
for X compared to W; t(39) = 3.42, p = .001, BF = 128.57, d = .54. Although the ratings
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for C looked a little higher than for F, there was no evidence for a significant difference;
t(39) = 1.93,  p = .061,  BF = .70,  d = .31.  These results  are  consistent  with theory
protection, with participants learning more about the causally ambiguous blocked cue
(X)  than  the  causally  non-ambiguous  discriminative  cue  (C).  As  with  the  previous
experiments,  this  finding  is  incompatible  with  a  prediction  error  account  (Rescorla,
2001). 
Figure 6. Experiment 3 Test stage ratings for all single stimuli and the two compound
cues. Panel B is a plot showing inter-subject variability on the key XF-WC difference.
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2.5: General Discussion
The three experiments in this chapter provide evidence that causal learning in humans
is, at least in part, governed by theory protection. If participants hold a stronger theory
about a cue, then they appear to protect this theory to a greater extent, compared to cues
about which they do not hold a strong theory. Therefore, differing confidence about the
causal status of cues appears to govern which cues are learned about the most, rather
than differences  in  the  size of  the  prediction error.  In  each experiment,  participants
apparently resisted updating their beliefs about cues with a known causal status, instead
attributing unexpected outcomes to cues with a comparatively ambiguous causal status.
This occurred despite the ambiguous cues having the smaller prediction error at the start
of the second training stage in all three experiments. The results of these experiments
are the opposite to those that might be expected on the basis of prediction error accounts
of learning (Bush & Mosteller, 1951; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Rescorla, 2001). A
theoretical implication of particular interest is the idea that humans act to protect their
theories about known causal relationships. This idea is intuitive, in terms of learning
being a  process of  acquiring information about  the things  we are unsure about  and
incorporating this information alongside existing knowledge.
The  theory  protection  account  provides  an  alternative  explanation  for  previous
experiments using compound testing procedures in humans. For example, Mitchell et al.
(2008) initially gave participants A+ C+ training, and then subsequently trained cue A
and a novel cue B in a causal compound (AB+). A forced choice test on two compounds
(AD versus BC) revealed evidence of more learning about the novel cue B during AB+
trials.  This effect was subsequently replicated with a larger  outcome (AB++) in  the
second training stage, again showing more learning about B than about A. Although
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these data are consistent with a prediction error account, they are also consistent with
the theory protection account,  showing that  these accounts need not  make opposing
predictions in all cases. This is because B would have both the greater prediction error
and the more ambiguous causal status at the start of the second training stage, as nothing
had yet been learned about it. In another experiment, Le Pelley and McLaren (2001)
initially  trained  two  cues  as  excitors  (A+  C+),  and  two  other  cues  (B  and  D)  as
inhibitors (BE- DE- E+). One cue of each type was used in the second training phase
(AB+); the results of a subsequent compound test revealed that participants had learned
more about cue A than cue B, despite the latter presumably having a greater prediction
error. Although participants should have been confident about the causal status of both
A and B following initial training, these findings are still compatible with the theory
protection  account  because  participants  appeared  to  maintain  (and  strengthen)  their
belief that A was a cause of the outcome but B was not. This suggests that there may be
more to theory protection than just differences in confidence governing learning; the
discussion of Chapter 3 (3.6) and parts of Chapter 5 consider the broader manner in
which theory protection might operate, and the role for causal confidence within such a
framework.
While the results of the present experiments appear to be inconsistent with a prediction
error account, they might be accommodated if an additional process is invoked. One
obvious candidate is the modification of attention to cues as a result of experience. For
example,  Mackintosh’s  (1975)  model  of  learning  is  compatible  with  the  results  of
Experiments 1 and 2. According to Mackintosh’s model, more attention will be paid to
cues that are better predictors of outcomes rather than poorer predictors, resulting in
more learning about these cues. Rather than this attentional process being an alternative
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to  prediction error,  it  is  instead suggested to  operate  alongside individual prediction
error, with attention determining associability. It is not necessary to know the equation
for this model, for the purposes of this thesis, but it is included in an addendum at the
end of Chapter 5. In Experiments 1 and 2, X might be considered more predictive of the
outcome than Y during Stage 1. This is because X was consistently followed by the
outcome, whereas Y was followed by the outcome on BY+ trials but not CY- trials. If
participants paid more attention to X than to Y as a result, this could have led to greater
learning about X than Y during Stage 2. Experiment 3, however, is harder to reconcile
with Mackintosh’s model. Cue C was a better predictor of the absence of the outcome
than Y on CY- trials, so the model predicts that participants should have learned to pay
attention to C during Stage 1. Although X was consistently paired with the outcome on
AX+ trials, it was a poorer predictor of that outcome than A (because of the separate A+
trials) and should therefore have suffered at least some decline in attention during Stage
1. Consequently, greater learning for X than for C during Stage 2 cannot have been the
result of changes in attention that occurred during Stage 1. Mackintosh’s model can only
be reconciled with the results of Experiment 3 if one assumes that the relevant changes
in attention occurred during Stage 2. Before the first XC+ trial, C had only been paired
with  the  absence  of  the  outcome.  When it  was  subsequently  presented  in  the  XC+
compound, it was therefore a poor predictor of the outcome. This could have resulted in
a rapid decline in the associability of C relative to X, leading to more learning about X
than C from the second trial onwards, in spite of C having the larger prediction error.
However, this account is not readily supported by the XC+ training data (see Figure 5).
If these data are taken at face value, almost all the learning about the XC+ compound
appears  to  have  taken  place  during  the  first  Stage  2  trial,  before  any  update  in
associability could have influenced learning. This interpretation should be treated with
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caution, however, since high causal ratings for XC+ from the second trial onwards do
not necessarily imply that learning was complete. To investigate this point further, an
obvious next step would be to conduct a similar experiment to Experiment 3, but with
only one XC+ training trial  in Stage 2. Two pilot experiments have been conducted
using this procedure but the results were inconclusive. The data and analyses for these
two  unpublished  experiments  are  available  online  at  https://osf.io/8f3a7/ and
https://osf.io/9dvcf/ Mackintosh's model is instead tested against the theory protection
account in Chapter 3, using a different approach.
An additional way in which Mackintosh’s (1975) theory could be reconciled with the
results in this chapter, is if one assumes that cues given high and low causal ratings
differ in their associability changes. For example, it may be that cues given low causal
ratings acquire associability at a slower rate than those given high causal ratings. If this
were the case, then it would be possible for X to have higher associability than C at the
start of Stage 2. The most obvious way to test this would be to train participants with
one cue that is a cause of an outcome, which also has a non-ambiguous causal status,
alongside another cue that does not cause that outcome, but which is less predictive and
has a more ambiguous status. If both cues were then trained in a compound that does
not cause the outcome in Stage 2, Mackintosh’s model would predict a more substantial
decrease in  associative strength for the previously predictive causal cue.  The theory
protection account, on the other hand, would predict more learning about the causally
ambiguous cue. This idea is also tested directly in Chapter 3. 
An alternative view of how attention changes as a result of experience was provided by
Pearce  and Hall  (1980).  They proposed  that  animals  pay  attention  to  cues  that  are
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followed by surprising outcomes, and that cues that are followed by predicted outcomes
suffer a decline in attention. The associability is calculated by subtracting the sum of the
associative  strengths  on the  previous  trial  from the  asymptote  of  learning.  It  is  not
necessary to  know the equation for this  model  either,  but  it  is  also included in the
addendum at the end of Chapter 5. As stated in Chapter 1, Pearce and Hall’s model does
bear  some conceptual  resemblance  to  the  theory  protection  account.  Both  accounts
suggest that there should be less learning about cues that have known consequences,
encapsulating  the  idea  that  learning  is  a  process  of  reducing  uncertainty  about  our
environment. However, the mechanisms are quite different. In the case of Pearce and
Hall’s model this process is outcome-directed, as it is the surprisingness of the outcome
that governs any update in associability (and consequently associative strength) for all
cues that are present. In the case of the theory protection account, it is knowledge about
the status of cues themselves, rather than outcomes, that influences future learning. In
other words, learning is driven by knowledge about individual cues, rather than being
driven by knowledge about the outcomes that simultaneously presented cues are paired
with. This difference in focus means that the two theories make differing predictions for
the present experiments. For example, by the end of Stage 1 of Experiment 3, Pearce
and Hall’s  model predicts a decline in attention for all cues because the outcome is
predictable  on  every  trial.  The  training  data  from  this  experiment  suggest  that,  if
anything,  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  outcome  was  better  predicted  on  trials
containing X than trials containing C. As a result, the associability of each cue should
have  been  low  at  the  outset  of  Stage  2,  with  a  possible  advantage  for  C.  This  is
inconsistent with the observation of greater learning for X than for C in Stage 2. The
theory protection account predicts  more learning about  X than about  C because the
causal status of X was ambiguous at the end of Stage 1, even though the outcome was
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predictable on AX+ trials. Pearce and Hall’s model similarly predicts that all cues in
Stage 1 of Experiments 1 and 2 should decline in associability. This would lead to equal
learning about both cues in Stage 2. The Mackintosh, and Pearce and Hall attentional
models are investigated further in Chapter 3. 
It  is  worth  briefly  mentioning  that,  somewhat  unusually  for  studies  of  predictive
learning, plots of inter-subject variability were provided for the key tests. These plots
suggest that a substantial minority of participants may be behaving in a way consistent
with prediction error accounts (i.e. they individually have an XZ-WY difference that is
zero  or  negative).  The  amount  of  data  collected  per  participant  in  the  current
experiments precludes any examination of whether this is a stable individual difference;
it could, alternatively, be measurement error. Future research might examine this issue
of the presence of stable individual differences by lengthening test stages, or testing the
same people across multiple procedures.
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3.1: Theory Protection 2
According  to  the  theory  protection  account,  learning is  influenced by the  extent  to
which  participants  already  have  a  theory  about  what  cues  do.  Instead  of  learning
according to how large each prediction error is,  human participants should maintain
existing causal associations, as far as is possible, and attribute unexpected outcomes to
cues about which they are not confident. To return to the example of medication from
Chapter 1, if you have already learned that a particular medication causes a headache
(A+) then you might be resistant to updating your beliefs when further consumption of
A does not result in a headache. If you have taken this medication in combination with
something else (AB-), you should attribute the absence of the headache more readily to
the added substance B, provided that this  attribution does not contradict  an existing
theory about B. 
As already stated,  the theory protection account  has obvious  implications in  human
learning  for  the  Rescorla  (2001)  experiment  described  in  Chapter  1.  Recall  that,
following A+ (and C+) training in the first stage, a compound of cue A and previously
non-reinforced cue B was extinguished (AB-) in  the second stage.  At test,  Rescorla
observed  less  conditioned  responding  to  a  compound  of  AD  than  to  BC.  Rescorla
concluded that, consistent with the prediction error principle, the associative strength of
A declined more than that of B on the AB- trials. A different result is predicted by the
theory protection account proposed in this thesis. This approach suggests that, using the
same design, one should see the opposite result in humans to that observed in rats. This
is because A+ training in the first stage shows that A must be a cause of the outcome.
Participants  would  be  expected  to  protect  this  theory  from change.  In  contrast,  B-
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training in the first stage allows participants to ascertain with confidence that B is not a
cause of the outcome, but does not allow them to confidently determine whether B is
neutral or preventative of the outcome. Participants can protect their existing theories
about A and B during AB- trials by concluding that B is preventative of the outcome
that  would  otherwise  have  been produced by A.  On the  compound test,  the  theory
protection account therefore predicts that the BC compound should receive lower causal
ratings than AD. 
The current chapter contains four experiments of this type, in which human participants
were trained with a causal scenario that was again designed to allow the comparison of
the prediction error and theory protection accounts. Experiments 6 and 7 also tested the
theory protection account against both the Mackintosh (1975) and the Pearce and Hall
(1980)  attentional  accounts.  In  the  second  training  stage  of  each  experiment,  a
previously trained causal cue was trained in compound with another cue with a more
ambiguous causal status, including a close replication of the Rescorla (2001) design in
Experiment  3.  It  is  worth  noting  that  a  variant  of  this  design  was  conducted  by
Haselgrove  and  Evans  (2010),  although  these  were  some important  methodological
differences.  Their  design  and  findings  are  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  General
Discussion  (3.6)  at  the  end of  this  chapter.  A key  difference,  in  comparison to  the
Chapter 2 experiments, was that the compounds were followed by the absence of the
outcome (rather than the presence of the outcome). This means that these experiments
used an extinction design rather than an acquisition design. Furthermore, the types of
cue used to create differing degrees of confidence were very different to those used in
the Chapter 2 experiments.  The scenario employed was also different.  Based on the
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theory protection account, it was expected that there would be more learning about the
ambiguous cue during compound trials. 
The  experiments  reported  in  this  chapter  also  encompass  some  other  important
differences to those in Chapter 2. For example, the suggestion about cues given high
and low causal ratings differing in their rate of associability chance (see Chapter 2.5:
General Discussion) is tested. Participants were trained with one cue that was a cause of
an outcome, which also had a non-ambiguous causal status, alongside another cue that
did not cause that outcome, but which was less predictive and had a more ambiguous
status.  In other words,  the causally certain cue would have higher ratings (after  the
initial  training  stage)  than  the  causally  uncertain  cue.  This  is  the  opposite  to  the
experiments in the previous chapter. Additionally, Experiment 7 further tested the theory
protection account by asking participants to give their confidence about the causal status
of  each cue  (in  the form of  a  Probe Test  and a  Forced Choice stage),  prior  to  the
compound training stage. It is also worth noting that Experiments 6 and 7 predicted
more learning about  a  cue with no apparent  prediction error,  than one with a  large
prediction  error.  Such a  result  is  counter-intuitive,  if  one follows the  basic  logic  of
learning being proportional to prediction error. In other words, if there is no prediction
error, then there should be no learning.
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3.2: Experiment 4
This experiment used an allergist task in which participants had to learn whether an
allergic  reaction  would  occur,  on  the  basis  of  different  chemicals  being  ingested.
Participants were presented with a fictional scenario in which they were working in a
drug research setting, trying to work out which chemicals cause the side effect of a
stomach ache in a test patient. Participants were told that chemicals could be causal,
neutral,  or preventative with respect to the stomach ache outcome. On each training
trial, participants were presented with one or more chemicals and were asked to predict
whether  or not the patient would experience a  stomach ache after consuming them.
Once participants had made their prediction, they were provided with feedback as to
whether or not a stomach ache occurred. Following training, participants were tested by
being asked to make ratings indicating how likely they thought a stomach ache would
be after the patient ingested specific chemicals singly or in pairs. The design of the
experiment is shown in Table 2. Participants were initially trained with two causal cues
(A+ and C+), and two non-causal cues (E- and F-). The non-causal cues were added as
fillers, so that participants experienced both the presence and the absence of the stomach
ache during Stage 1. Next, participants were trained with a non-causal compound AB-
that consisted of a previously causal cue (A) and a novel cue (B). The novel cue was
chosen to minimize the extent to which participants might have any causal theory about
B at the start of AB- training. According to individual prediction error there should be
more learning about A, since it was consistently paired with the outcome during Stage
1. According to overall prediction error there should be equal learning about A and B,
because both of these cues share their prediction error. However, the theory protection
account predicts more learning about B, since participants should protect their theory
that A is causal, and instead attribute the absence of the outcome to the novel B. 
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Table 2. The design of experiments 4-6
Experiment Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
4 A+  C+  E-  F- AB- AD  BC 
A  B  C  D  E  F
5 A+  C+  E-  F-
B?   D?
AB- AD  BC 
A  B  C  D  E  F
6 A+  C+  B-  D- AB- AD  BC
A  C  B  D
Key:
Letters A-F = different cues
+ = stomach ache
- = no stomach ache
? = outcome concealed from participants
Learning about A and B was compared using a final test discrimination equivalent to
Rescorla (2001). In addition to being asked for the likelihood of the outcome for each
individual cue, participants were asked to give likelihood ratings for two compounds,
AD and BC. Each of these compounds contained one cue that had been trained as causal
in Stage 1, and one that had not been encountered in Stage 1. In the absence of Stage 2
training, these two compounds should have been assigned the same likelihood ratings at
test.  Consequently,  any  difference  between  these  compounds  must  necessarily  have
been the result of the AB- training in Stage 2, and would indicate differing amounts of
learning  about  A and  B  during  that  stage.  If  learning  is  governed  by  individual
prediction error, participants should have rated the likelihood of the outcome as being
lower for AD than BC, as a result of A decreasing in associative strength during the AB-
trials. If learning is governed by overall prediction error, then there should have been no
difference between ratings of AD and BC. However, if learning is determined by the
theory protection account, then BC should have been assigned lower ratings than AD at
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test, indicating that participants learned during the AB- trials that B is preventative of
the outcome, in order to protect their existing theory that A is causal.
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3.2.2: Method
Participants
Forty  psychology  students  from  the  University  of  Plymouth  participated  in  this
experiment, in return for course credits (28 female, 11 male, 1 non-binary; mean age =
23.05 , SD = 7.03). This sample size has adequate power to detect medium-sized within-
subjects effects (87% power at d = 0.5). People who had previously taken part in similar
experiments were excluded from this study, to ensure participants were naive to the
purpose of the experiment.
Materials
Participants were tested in the same lab at the University of Plymouth. The experiment
was  conducted  using  Viglen  Genie  desktop  computers,  running  the  Windows  10
operating  system.  The  computers  all  used  22-inch  Phillips  LED  displays,  with
participants at  a typical  distance (of approximately 40-80 cm) from the screen.  The
experiment  was designed and executed in  Psychopy (Peirce,  2007),  with the output
generated as individual CSV files for each participant. Participants made their responses
by pressing keys on a standard UK computer keyboard during the training stages, and
by using mouse clicks during the test stage. The six individual cues were represented on
screen as different coloured images of shapes: blue oval, green square, grey triangle,
pink diamond, purple star, yellow circle. All the coloured shapes were presented within
a white square. The dimensions of each cue (including the white square) were 300 x 300
pixels on a 1920 x 1080 pixel screen. For each participant, the coloured shapes were
randomly assigned to serve as A, B, C, D, E, and F. The two outcomes, ‘stomach ache’
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and ‘no stomach ache’, were represented by text on screen and a photograph of a man
clutching his stomach, or a man giving a ‘thumbs up’, respectively. The outcome images
were  presented  within  a  white  rectangle.  The  dimensions  of  the  outcome  images
(including the white rectangle) were 291 x 332 pixels. All experimental text, including
instructions, was white. A black background was used throughout the experiment. Study
information sheets, consent forms and debrief forms were all printed on paper.
Design
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 2. During Stage 1,
participants were presented with twelve blocks of training. The four trial types (A+, C+,
E-,  F-)  appeared  in  a  random  order  within  each  block.  Each  trial  type  was  only
presented once within each block. There were six trials in Stage 2, all with AB-. During
the Test stage, participants were presented with two blocks of test cues. The eight trial
types (A, B, C, D, E, F, AD, BC) appeared in a random order within each block. Each
trial type was only presented once within each block. 
 
Procedure
Participants were required to read an information sheet and sign a consent form prior to
participating in the experiment.  The experimental instructions were presented on the
screen at the start of the experiment. They were adapted from Spicer et al. (2019) and
displayed as follows:
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This study is concerned with the way in which people learn about relationships between
events. In the present case,  you should learn whether the consumption of chemicals
used in drug research, leads to an allergic reaction.
Imagine that you are working in a drug research laboratory, studying chemicals for
potential use in medication. You are trying to identify which chemicals cause the side
effect of a stomach ache in your test patient. 
To identify which chemicals they react to, the patient ingests specific chemicals and
observes whether a stomach ache occurs or not. The results of these tests are shown to
you on the screen one after the other. 
You will then be asked to predict whether the patient suffers from stomach ache. For
this prediction, please click on the appropriate response button. After you have made
your prediction, you will be informed whether your patient suffered from stomach ache
or not. Use this feedback to find out which chemicals cause a stomach ache in your
patient.
You will  always be told what  your  patient  has  ingested.  Sometimes,  they have only
consumed  a  single  chemical  and  other  times  they  have  consumed  two  different
chemicals. Please look at the chemicals carefully.
At first you will have to guess the outcome because you do not know anything about
your patient. But eventually you will learn which chemicals lead to stomach ache in this
patient and you will be able to make correct predictions.
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All of the chemicals being studied can be easily identified by a unique logo. Each logo
is both a different shape and a different colour.
For all of your answers, accuracy rather than speed is essential. Please do not take any
notes during the experiment. If you have any questions, please ask them now. 
Please note, some chemicals will cause a stomach ache, while others will be neutral
and will not cause a stomach ache. However, it is also possible for specific chemicals to
actively PREVENT a stomach ache from occurring in your patient.
If you do not have any questions, please start the experiment by pressing the space bar.
For each trial during the training stages, the cues were visually presented on either the
left-hand side of the screen or the right-hand side of the screen. When only one image
was presented, the opposite side of the screen contained a blank space. The cues were
randomly assigned to either the left or right position on each trial. Text at the top of the
screen stated that ‘The patient ingests the following:’, with the cues presented below
this. Underneath the cues, further text stated ‘Which outcome do you expect? Please use
your  keyboard  to  respond’.  Participants  were  instructed  to  respond  by  pressing  the
appropriate  key  on their  keyboard;  Z  for  ‘No Stomach  Ache’ and  M for  ‘Stomach
Ache’. After participants made their response, the feedback for that trial was shown.
The  feedback  screen  consisted  of  the  appropriate  outcome  image  along  with  its
accompanying  text,  indicating  either  ‘Stomach  Ache’ or  ‘No  Stomach  Ache’.  The
feedback was shown on screen for two seconds, after which the next trial began. 
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After the completion of Stage 1, Stage 2 started with no trial break, so that from the
perspective of participants this  was a seamless continuation of the training.  Stage 2
consisted of a previously unseen compound AB- presented six times in a row. As in
Stage 1, the cues were randomised on each trial to appear on either the left- or right-
hand side of the screen. The on-screen text and responding via the keyboard was the
same as in Stage 1. The process for displaying the trial feedback was also the same,
except that all six trials resulted in ‘Stomach Ache’ as the outcome. 
After  the  completion  of  Stage  2,  a  further  instruction  screen  was  shown  before
commencement of the Test stage:
Next, your task is to judge the probability with which specific chemicals cause stomach
ache in your patient. Single chemicals and pairs of chemicals will be shown to you on
the screen. 
In this part of the experiment, you will receive no feedback about the actual reaction of
the patient. Use the information that you have collected so far, to make your rating.
Press space bar to continue the experiment.
For each trial during the Test stage, the cues were visually presented on either the left-
or right-hand side of the screen. When only one image was presented, the opposite side
of the screen again contained a blank space. The cues were randomly assigned to either
the left or right position on each trial. As before, text at the top of the screen stated that
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‘The patient ingests the following:’, with the cues presented below this. Underneath the
cues,  further  text  stated  ‘How likely  are  they  to  suffer  a  stomach ache?  (0  = Very
Unlikely; 10 = Very Likely)’. Participants were instructed to respond by clicking on an
11-point rating scale using their mouse pointer, to indicate how likely they thought the
occurrence of a stomach ache would be. The rating scale was located in the lower part
of the screen, with the 11-point scale running from left to right, in ascending numerical
order. After participants made their response, a blank screen appeared for 0.4 secs, after
which the next test trial was presented. Following the completion of the experiment,
participants were provided with a debrief form. 
Analysis
The data were processed and analysed using R (R Core Team, 2018). The difference
between the AD and BC test  compounds was assessed using paired-samples t-tests.
Some additional analyses were also conducted on key single test  stimuli,  to test  for
specific predicted differences between cue ratings. The alpha level was set to p < .05 for
all tests. As these tests were done on the basis of specific prior predictions, there was no
need to correct for multiple comparisons. Bayesian t-tests were also conducted, using
the procedure recommended by Dienes (2011) and implemented as R code by Baguley
and Kaye (2010). A uniform distribution was specified as the prior for each test, with a
lower limit of -10 and an upper limit of 10 (in terms of the mean difference between
ratings), because these are the largest mean differences in either direction permitted by
an 11-point test rating scale. In keeping with accepted conventions (e.g. Jeffreys, 1961),
a Bayes factor of over three was set as the level providing evidence for a difference,
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while a Bayes factor of less than one third was set as the level providing evidence for no
difference. Values between these levels were accepted as being inconclusive.
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3.2.3: Results and Discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/bzerh  / . The descriptive statistics for the Experiment 4 training stages are
shown in Figure 7. The data from Stage 1 indicate that participants learned sufficiently
about the four different cues by the time Stage 1 was complete. Similarly, the data from
Stage 2 indicate that participants learned that the AB- compound was non-causal by the
end of Stage 2. 
Figure 7. Experiment 4 training Stage 1 and 2 data.
Descriptive statistics for the Experiment 4 Test stage are shown in Figure 8. Ratings for
BC were significantly lower than for AD; t(39) = 5.61,  p < .001,  BF = 4.08 x105,  d
= .89. Further testing revealed lower ratings for the single cue B compared to D;  t(39) =
8.48, p < .001, BF = 2.23 x1014, d = 1.34. Conversely, there was no difference between
the ratings assigned to A and C; t(39) = .04, p = .919, BF = .05, d = .02, indicating that
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participants did not learn about A during Stage 2. Taken as a whole, these findings show
that the differences between the compounds were specifically driven by learning about
B during AB- trials, with participants maintaining their association between A and the
occurrence of stomach ache. Figure 3 panel B shows inter-subject variability on the key
compound  test  difference.  As  would  be  expected  from the  mean  test  ratings,  most
individual participants rated BC lower than AB, although the variability did extend to
some  participants  assigning  a  lower  rating  to  AB. It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the
intermediate mean rating for D during the Test stage is consistent with the idea that
participants do not know the causal status of novel cues, and are consequently unlikely
to assign high or low ratings (see Chapter 4 four a detailed exploration of uncertainty
about  novel  cues).  These  data  appear  to  support  the  theory  protection  account,  as
opposed  to  a  prediction  error  account  (Rescorla,  2001).  However,  one  possible
limitation of this experiment is that novel cues are often regarded as being more salient
than familiar cues (e.g. Lubow & Moore, 1959). Consequently, B may have been more
salient than A during training Stage 2, and this may have led to more learning about B
than  A,  despite  B  having  a  smaller  prediction  error.  Experiment  5  addressed  this
alternative  account,  by  replacing  the  two  novel  cues  with  familiar  cues  that  had  a
causally unknown status.
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Figure  8.  Panel  A  shows  Experiment  4  Test  stage  ratings  for  single  cues  and
compounds.  Panel  B  is  a  plot  showing  inter-subject  variability  on  the  key  AD-BC
difference.
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3.3: Experiment 5
This was a variant of Experiment 4 in which cues B and D were causally ambiguous but
not novel. This was achieved by exposing participants to cues B and D during Stage 1,
but not revealing their causal status. In keeping with the allergy paradigm, participants
were informed that the patient information was missing on these trials, rather than being
told whether or not a stomach ache occurred. This allowed B and D to be familiar at the
end of Stage 1 of the experiment, but for participants to still hold no strong theory about
their causal status. It also permitted an examination of the generality of Experiment 4 by
testing whether the theory protection account would still apply when a different type of
causally-ambiguous cue was employed. The design of Experiment 5 is shown in Table
2.  All  of  the  other  experimental  details  were  the  same  as  Experiment  4.  The
experimental  predictions  were also the  same,  in  that  cue  A would  have  the  greater
prediction error at the start of Stage 2, and participants would be less likely to have a
theory about B. As before, the expectation was that participants would maintain their
belief  that  A is  a cause during Stage 2,  instead learning about B, and giving lower
ratings for the BC compound at test. 
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3.3.2: Method
Participants
Thirty-six psychology students from the University  of  Plymouth participated in  this
experiment, in return for course credit  (26 female, 10 male; mean age = 24.67, SD =
6.81).  This  sample  size  has  adequate  power  to  detect  medium-sized  within-subjects
effects  (83% power  at  d  =  0.5).  People  who  had  previously  taken  part  in  similar
experiments were excluded from this study, to ensure participants were naive to the
purpose of the experiment. 
Materials
The materials used for Experiment 5 were the same as those used for Experiment 4,
with the exception of  an additional  image and text  used for the concealed-outcome
trials. The ‘information missing’ trial feedback was represented by text on screen and an
image  of  a  black  question  mark.  As  with  the  other  trial  feedback,  the  image  was
presented within a white rectangle. The dimensions of the image (including the white
rectangle) were 291 x 332 pixels.
Design
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 2. During Stage 1,
participants were presented with twelve blocks of training. The six trial types (A+, B?,
C+, D?, E-, F-) appeared in a random order within each block. Each trial type was only
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presented  once  within  each  block.  Stage  2  and  the  Test  stage  were  identical  to
Experiment 4. 
Procedure and analysis
Apart from the changes described above, the procedure and analysis for Experiment 5
were the same as for Experiment 4. 
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3.3.3: Results and Discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/amubk/. The descriptive statistics for the Experiment 5 training stages are
shown in Figure 9. The data from Stage 1 indicate that participants learned sufficiently
about the six different trial types by the time training was complete. The intermediate
responses  for  B and D are consistent  with participants  being  unconfident  about  the
causal status of these cues. Similarly, the data from Stage 2 indicate that participants
learned that the AB- compound was non-causal by the time training was complete. 
Figure 9. Experiment 5 training Stage 1 and Stage 2 data.
Descriptive statistics for the Experiment 5 Test stage are shown in Figure 10. Ratings
for BC were significantly lower than for AD; t(35) = 3.34,  p = .002,  BF = 17.83,  d
= .56. Further testing revealed lower ratings for the single cue B compared to D;  t(35) =
5.06, p < .001, BF = 2.17 x104, d = .84. Conversely, there was no difference between the
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ratings assigned to A and C;  t(35) = .50,  p = .62,  BF = .03,  d  = .08. These findings
indicate  that  the  differences  between  the  compounds  were  specifically  driven  by
learning  about  B  during  AB-  trials.  As  with  the  novel  cues  in  Experiment  4,  the
intermediate rating for D at test is consistent with participants holding no reliable theory
about the causal status of concealed-outcome cues. Taken as a whole, these data are
again consistent with the theory protection account, as opposed to a prediction error
account (Rescorla, 2001). This is because the novel and concealed-outcome cues had a
smaller prediction error than the causal cues at the start of Stage 2 in both experiments,
as  indicated  by  the  intermediate  responses  for  B  and  D  during  Stage  1  (for  the
concealed-outcome cues) and the intermediate ratings for D during the Test stage (for
both the novel cues and the concealed-outcome cues). 
Figure  10.  Panel  A  shows  Experiment  5  Test  stage  ratings  for  single  cues  and
compounds.  Panel  B  is  a  plot  showing  inter-subject  variability  on  the  key  AD-BC
difference. 
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Whilst the Experiment 4 and 5 data are irreconcilable with a prediction error account,
they could be explained according to the attentional processes represented Pearce and
Hall (1980) and Mackintosh (1975) models. Recall that, according to Pearce and Hall
(1980),  associability  is  highest  for  cues  that  are  unreliable  predictors  of  outcomes,
which results in greater learning about those cues. Importantly, novel cues are stated to
have high starting associability, which then declines if these cues are reliable predictors.
In Experiment 4, the associability of A should have declined during Stage 1, because it
was a good predictor of stomach ache. Meanwhile, the associability of B should have
been high at the start of Stage 2, as a consequence of its novelty. Pearce and Hall’s
model therefore predicts more learning about B than A during the AB- trials, at least at
the start of Stage 2. In Experiment 5, the associability of B should have remained high
across Stage 1, despite its familiarity, because participants did not have an opportunity
to  observe  the  outcome.  A,  meanwhile,  should  have  declined  in  associability  as  a
consequence of being consistently paired with stomach ache. Hence, Pearce and Hall’s
model provides a  plausible account  of both Experiments 4 and 5.  Of course,  it  has
already been established that  the Pearce and Hall  attentional  account  is  not  able  to
capture  the  results  of  the  experiments  reported  in  Chapter  2.  However,  a  further
investigation of this account, in the context of the simpler experimental designs in this
Chapter seemed worthwhile.
Recall also that according to Mackintosh’s (1975) model, the best available predictor of
each  trial’s  outcome  increases  in  associability,  while  other  cues  decrease,  with
subsequent learning being the product of this updated associability and an individual
prediction  error.  Similarly  to  Experiment  3,  the  way in  which  Mackintosh’s  (1975)
model can capture the Experiment 4 and 5 results is more subtle than Pearce and Hall’s
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(1980) explanation outlined above. This is because, during Stage 1 of Experiment 4, A
should have received an increase in associability.  As a result,  the associability of A
should have been higher than that of B at the start of Stage 2. The same is perhaps true
of Experiment 5,  since withholding information about  the consequences of B might
have prevented participants  from learning that  B was predictive. A should therefore
have had both the greater individual prediction error and the higher associability at the
end of Stage 1 in both experiments. This means that A should have been learned about
the most  at  the start  of Stage 2.  However,  after  the first  Stage 2 trial,  the outcome
predicted by B would have been less discrepant with the AB- outcome (i.e. no stomach
ache)  than  the  outcome  predicted  by  A.  Hence,  the  associability  of  B  would  have
increased,  while  the  associability  of  A  would  have  decreased.  These  changes  in
associability could produce more learning about B, in spite of it  having the smaller
prediction error throughout Stage 2.  Since both Mackintosh’s and Pearce and Hall’s
(1980) model can be reconciled with the results of Experiments 4 and 5, Experiment 6
was designed such that both of these models make different predictions to the theory
protection account. 
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3.4: Experiment 6
This experiment was a close replication of the Rescorla (2001) rat design, also using a
very similar design to that of Experiments 4 and 5 to test the theory protection account
against  Pearce  and  Hall’s  (1980)  and  Mackintosh’s  (1975)  models.  The  design  of
Experiment 6 is  shown in Table 2.  To ensure that Pearce and Hall’s  model  made a
different prediction to the theory protection account, cue B was a good predictor of the
trial outcome during Stage 1. In place of a novel cue (Experiment 4) or a cue with a
concealed outcome (Experiment 5), here B was reliably followed by the absence of
stomach ache. According to Pearce and Hall,  since A and B were equally predictive
during Stage 1 (A of stomach ache and B of no stomach ache), they should both have
suffered equivalent decrements in associability during Stage 1 and there should have
been no difference in learning about these cues during Stage 2. This design also ensured
that there was no individual prediction error associated with B on the Stage 2 AB- trials,
since both these trials and the preceding Stage 1 trials with B ended in the absence of
stomach ache. Mackintosh’s model therefore predicts no learning about B in Stage 2,
because it proposes that learning is proportional to individual prediction error. As with
the previous experiments,  Rescorla’s (2001) account predicts  more learning about A
than B during Stage 2 because of its larger individual prediction error. 
The theory protection account predicts more learning about B than A on AB- trials, just
as in Experiments 4 and 5. This is because, following B- training, the status of B should
still have been somewhat ambiguous; it might have been neutral with regard to stomach
ache, or it might have been preventative. Therefore, to protect their theory about cue A
being causal, participants were expected to infer that cue B was preventative. The use of
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B- and D- trials in Stage 1 had one other minor implication for the experimental design.
In this experiment, the E- and F- trials were not needed to provide experience of non-
reinforced cues in Stage 1, as in the previous experiments. As before, the Test stage
contained two compounds, AD and BC, which permitted a comparison of learning about
A and B. Based on the theory protection account, it was expected that there would be
higher ratings for AD than for BC. This is in contrast to the predictions of other models,
which either predict no difference (Pearce and Hall, 1980), or higher ratings for BC
(Mackintosh,  1975;  Rescorla,  2001).  Because  Stage  1  training  should  have  at  least
allowed participants to learn with confidence that B was not a cause of stomach ache
(unlike in Experiments 4 and 5), it was expected that the size of the AD-BC difference
would be smaller than in previous experiments. 
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3.4.2: Method
Participants
Forty  psychology  students  from  the  University  of  Plymouth  participated  in  this
experiment, in return for course credit (35 female, 5 male; mean age = 22.03 SD =
7.55). This sample size has adequate power to detect effects somewhat smaller than
those observed in Experiments 4-5.  Specifically, the mean effect size for the AD-BC
comparison across these two experiments is d = 0.73. At the current sample size, a 38%
reduction in that effect size (to d= 0.45) would still result in adequate (80%) power.
People who had previously taken part in similar experiments were excluded, to ensure
participants were naive to the purpose of the experiment. 
Materials
The materials used for Experiment 6 were the same as those used for Experiment 4.
Design
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 1. During Stage 1,
participants were presented with twelve blocks of training. The four trial types (A+, B-,
C+,  D-)  appeared  in  a  random  order  within  each  block.  Each  trial  type  was  only
presented once within each block. There were six trials in Stage 2, all with AB-. During
the Test stage, participants were presented with two blocks of test cues. The six trial
types (A, B, C, D, AD, BC) appeared in a random order within each block. Each trial
type was only presented once within each block. 
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Procedure and analysis
Apart from the changes described above, the procedure for Experiment 6 was the same
as for Experiments 4 and 5. The analyses were the same, except that the Bayesian priors
for the compound test were updated on the basis of the mean result across Experiments
4 and 5. As explained above, in Stage 1 of Experiment 6, the range of outcomes that
could be caused by cue B was reduced, so there was a theoretical basis for expecting the
mean  test  difference  to  be  smaller  than  the  values  observed  in  Experiments  4-5.
Therefore,  following  the  recommendations  of  Dienes  (2011),  a  half-normal  prior
distribution was specified for the Bayesian t-test on the compounds, with a mean of zero
and  a  standard  deviation  set  to  the  corresponding  mean  difference  observed  across
Experiments 4-5. A uniform prior, equivalent to Experiments 4-5, was specified for the
Bayesian t-tests on single cues. This is because neutral and preventative cues should
both  be  given  a  low rating  on  the  11-point  likelihood  scale,  so  no  difference  was
anticipated for either of the tests on single cues.
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3.4.3: Results and Discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/vqnbc/. Descriptive statistics for the training stages are shown in Figure
11. The data from Stage 1 indicate that participants learned sufficiently about the four
different trial types by the time training was complete. Similarly, the data from Stage 2
indicate that participants learned that the AB- compound was non-causal by the end of
Stage 2. The response data for the first Stage 2 trial is consistent with the participants
lacking confidence as to whether B was neutral or inhibitory.
Figure 11. Experiment 6 training Stage 1 and 2 data.
Descriptive statistics for the Test stage are shown in Figure 12. Ratings for BC were
significantly lower than for AD; t(39) = 3.37, p = .002, BF = 89.84, d = .53. The eleven-
point rating scale did not allow any difference between neutral and preventative cues to
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be detected, since both would be given a low rating. Therefore, there was no reason to
expect ratings for B and D to differ  t(39) = .54,  p < .59,  BF = .05,  d  = .09. As with
Experiments 1-2, there was no difference between the ratings assigned to A and C; t(39)
= .50,  p = .62,  BF = .02,  d  = .21.  These data  are  again consistent  with the theory
protection account and are, like the results of Experiments 4 and 5, the opposite of the
outcome  anticipated  by  an  individual  prediction  error  account.  Notably,  the  results
confirm the prediction that there would be greater learning about a cue with no apparent
prediction error, than one with a large prediction error. Crucially, neither Pearce and
Hall’s (1980) nor Mackintosh’s (1975) attentional models are able to account for these
findings either. According to Pearce and Hall, learning about B during Stage 2 should be
no  greater  than  that  for  A,  since  both  cues  should  have  an  equivalent  decline  in
associability during Stage 1. The lack of any individual prediction error with respect to
cue B, on the AB- trials of Stage 2, also means that Mackintosh’s model predicts no
learning for this cue. Cue A, by contrast, whatever its associability, would be expected
to extinguish on AB- trials.  Hence,  Mackintosh predicts  that compound AD will  be
assigned lower ratings than BC on test, which is the opposite of the observed result. 
According to the theory protection account, participants should have lacked confidence
about the causal status of B at the end of Stage 1, in spite of learning that it was not a
cause. However, the results of Experiment 6 contain no explicit evidence that this is so.
This is because the response method used to predict  the presence or absence of the
outcome did not allow participants to express any lack of confidence about whether a
cue was neutral or preventative. Although the responses made on the first Stage 2 trial
might indicate some lack of confidence about whether a stomach ache would occur (see
Figure 11), this could be due to either lacking causal confidence about B or some more
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general  causal  uncertainty  about  the  novel  combination  of  cues.  Experiment  7  was
intended  to  address  this  issue  by  including  a  measurement  of  participants’ relative
confidence about  A and B at  the end of Stage 1.  Experiment 7 also tested whether
participants had any sense that cue B might be to some extent inhibitory, as predicted. 
Figure  12.  Panel  A  shows  Experiment  6  Test  stage  ratings  for  single  cues  and
compounds.  Panel  B  is  a  plot  showing  inter-subject  variability  on  the  key  AD-BC
difference.
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3.5: Experiment 7
In addition to replicating the results of Experiment 6, the aim of Experiment 7 was to
assess whether there was a difference in participants’ confidence about the causal status
of A and B before the start of Stage 2. The design was identical to that of Experiment 6,
except for the addition of two extra stages between Stage 1 and Stage 2. The full design
of Experiment 7 is shown in Table 3. The first addition was a Probe Test, in which
participants  were asked to  make ratings  about  cues  A and B. Unlike the Test  stage
ratings, for which participants were asked to rate the likelihood of the outcome given a
specific cue or compound, participants were instead asked what they thought each of
cues A and B did. Participants were presented with a 21-point scale, running from -10 to
+10, where +10 meant the cue causes the outcome, 0 meant the cue is neutral, and -10
meant the cue prevents the outcome. The second addition was a Forced Choice stage, in
which participants  were asked to choose which of those two ratings (i.e. the ratings
assigned  to  A and  B  on  the  21-point  scale)  they  were  most  confident  about.  If
participants were confident about the causal status of A, but comparatively unconfident
about whether B was neutral or inhibitory, then they should have given a high rating to
A on the positive end of the Probe Test scale, and an intermediate rating to B in the
negative half of that scale. Furthermore, when asked which of these ratings they were
most confident about during the Forced Choice stage, they should have chosen A. These
findings would support the theory protection account. 
Table 3. The design of Experiment 7
Experiment Stage 1 Probe Test Forced Choice Stage 2 Test
4 A+  C+  B-  D- A  B A or B AB- AD  BC
A  C  B  D
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3.5.2: Method
Participants
Sixty-one psychology students  from the  University  of  Plymouth  participated  in  this
experiment, in return for course credit (51 female, 10 male; mean age = 21.02, SD =
6.01). This sample size has excellent power to detect the key AD versus BC comparison
at the effect size observed in Experiment 3 (99% power at d = 0.53), excellent power to
detect a medium-sized effect on the Probe Test (97% power at d = 0.5), and adequate
power to detect a medium-to-large effect on the forced-choice test (80% power at w =
0.36). People who had previously taken part in similar experiments were excluded, to
ensure participants were naive to the purpose of the experiment. 
Materials
The materials used for Experiment 7 were the same as those used for Experiment 4 and
Experiment 6.
Design 
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 3. Stage 1, Stage 2
and the Test stage used a design identical to Experiment 6. The Probe Test stage and
Forced  Choice  stage  were  added  between  Stages  1  and  2.  During  the  Probe  Test,
participants were presented with a single block containing only cues A and B. The cues
appeared in a random order, and were only presented once within the block. The Forced
Choice followed on immediately from the Probe Test. Participants were presented with
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a single trial, in which cues A and B were presented together on screen. The screen
position of A and B was randomised and counterbalanced, so that an equal number of
participants saw these cues in each of the two possible left-right configurations. 
Procedure
The procedure  for  Experiment  7  was the  same as  for  Experiment  6,  except  for  the
addition of the Probe Test and Forced Choice stages. Following the completion of Stage
1, an instruction screen was shown before the commencement of the Probe Test:
Next, your task is to make ratings about two of the chemicals you have learned about.
Firstly, you will be asked what these chemicals do when ingested by your patient (e.g.
cause stomach ache, prevent stomach ache, neutral). You will be able to make your
response using a rating scale. 
Once you have made your ratings, you will be asked which of those ratings you feel
most confident (i.e. certain) about. You will be able to make a response using a key
press. 
In this part of the experiment, you will receive no feedback about the actual reaction of
the patient. Use the information that you have collected so far, to make your choices. 
Press space bar to continue the experiment.
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For each trial during the Probe Test, the cues were visually presented in the centre of the
screen. Text at the top of the screen stated ‘Consider the following chemical:’, with the
cue  presented  below this.  Underneath  the  cue,  further  text  stated,  ‘What  does  this
chemical do when ingested by your patient? (-10 = Definitely Prevents Stomach Ache; 0
= Definitely Does Nothing; 10 = Definitely Causes Stomach Ache)’. Participants were
instructed to respond by clicking on a 21-point rating scale using their mouse pointer, to
indicate what they believed the causal status of the cue to be.  The rating scale was
located in the lower part of the screen, with the 21-point scale running from left to right,
in ascending numerical order.  After participants made their  response,  a blank screen
appeared for 0.4 secs, after which the next Probe Test trial was presented. Following the
completion of the Probe Test, the Forced Choice test commenced. During the single
Forced Choice trial, the cues were visually presented on either the left- or right-hand
side of the screen. The cues were randomly pre-assigned for each participant to the left
and right positions. Text at the top of the screen stated ‘You gave these ratings to the
two chemicals you were just asked about:’, with the cues presented below this and the
Probe Test ratings presented directly beneath each of the respective cues. Underneath
the ratings, further text stated ‘Which of these two ratings are you most confident (i.e.
certain) about?’ Participants were instructed to use their computer keyboard to respond
(Z for ‘Left Rating’ and M for ‘Right Rating’). After participants made their response, a
blank screen appeared for 0.4 secs, after which an instruction screen for Stage 2 was
presented. 
Next, you will continue to learn about the chemicals used in drug research, as you did
during the first part of the experiment. As before, the patient ingests specific chemicals
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and observes  whether  a stomach ache occurs or not.  The results  of  these tests  are
shown to you on the screen one after the other. 
You will then be asked to predict whether the patient suffers from stomach ache. For
this prediction, please click on the appropriate response button. After you have made
your prediction, you will be informed whether your patient suffered from stomach ache
or not. 
Press the space bar to continue.
Following the presentation of these instructions, Stage 2 of the experiment commenced
and the experiment continued, following the same procedure as Experiment 6.
Analysis
The analyses were the same as for Experiment 4, 5, and 6, except that the Bayesian
priors were updated on the basis of the results of Experiment 6, with the exception of
the Probe Test. Therefore, following the procedure recommended by Dienes (2011), a
normal distribution was specified as the prior for the Bayesian t-test on the compounds,
with the mean set to the corresponding Experiment 6 mean and the standard deviation
set to half this value. As with Experiment 6, a uniform prior was specified for the tests
on single cues, as no difference was anticipated. As there was no suitable previous study
on which  to  specify  a  plausible  predicted  effect  size  for  the  Probe Test,  a  uniform
distribution was specified, with a lower limit of -10 and an upper limit of 10 (for the
mean difference of the ratings from zero, and the mean difference between the unsigned
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ratings). These limits were chosen because 10 is the largest possible difference for these
comparisons. The Forced Choice data were analysed with a chi-square test. 
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3.5.3: Results and Discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/kwzdr/. The  descriptive  statistics  for  the  training  stages  are  shown  in
Figure 13. The data from Stage 1 indicate that participants learned sufficiently about the
four different trial types by the time training was complete. Similarly, the data from
Stage 2 indicate that participants learned that the AB- compound was non-causal by the
end of Stage 2. As before, the intermediate proportion of stomach ache responses on the
first Stage 2 trial supports the idea that participants lack confidence about the causal
status of  B.
Figure 13. Experiment 7 training Stage 1 and 2 data.
Descriptive statistics for the final Test stage are shown in Figure 14. As in Experiment 6,
ratings for BC were significantly lower than for AD; t(60) = 4.89, p < .001, BF = 6.57
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x104, d = .63. As in Experiment 6, the 11-point Test stage rating scale did not allow any
difference between neutral and preventative cues to be detected. Accordingly, there was
no difference between the ratings assigned to B and D, t(60) = .97, p < .34, BF = 0.04, d
= .12. There was also no difference between the ratings assigned to A and C;  t(60) =
1.02, p = .31,  BF = 0.04, d = .13, suggesting that nothing was learned about A during
Stage 2. As a replication of Experiment 6, these findings provide further support to the
theory protection account. 
Figure  14.  Panel  A  shows  Experiment  7  Test  stage  ratings  for  single  cues  and
compounds.  Panel  B  is  a  plot  showing  inter-subject  variability  on  the  key  AD-BC
difference.
The descriptive  statistics  for  the  Experiment  4  Probe Test  are  shown in  Figure  15.
Ratings for A were significantly greater than zero;  t(60) = 13.05,  p < .001, BF = 7.55
x1035, d = 1.67. Ratings for B were significantly below zero; t(60) = 7.89, p < .001, BF
= 2.34 x1012 d = 1.01. The ratings for cue A were significantly further from zero than the
ratings for cue B (i.e. the unsigned difference from zero was greater for A); t(60) = 8.56,
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p < .001, BF = 5.28 x1014, d = 1.10. The high positive mean rating for A, compared to
intermediate negative mean rating for B, suggests greater confidence about the causal
status of A than of B. These data support the prediction that participants would not know
whether  B was neutral  or inhibitory.  The Forced Choice results  further  support  this
view,  since  51  participants  chose  their  rating  for  cue  A as  the  one  they  were  most
confident about, while only 10 chose B. A chi-square test demonstrated that this was
significantly different to chance;  X2(60) = 27.56,  p  < .001,  w = .73.  These findings
indicate that participants lacked confidence about the causal status of B prior to the start
of Stage 2, despite having the opportunity to learn that it was not a cause. The results
suggest  that  this  lack  of  knowledge  facilitated  subsequent  learning  about  B,  while
confidence about the causal status of A meant participants protected their theory about
it, in spite of a larger prediction error. Deducing that B was preventative of stomach
ache is consistent with B- trials in Stage 1, so participants could also protect their theory
that B was not a cause. 
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Figure 15.  Panel A shows Experiment 7 Probe Test ratings for cues A and B. Panel B
shows inter-subject variability on the difference between the unsigned differences from
zero for these cues. Please note that the left hand boxplot in panel A is masked by the
concentration of individual participants providing that cue with a high rating.
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3.6: General Discussion
Taken as  a whole,  the findings  of  the four experiments  in  this  chapter  suggest  that
theory protection, in at least some circumstances, dictates the extent to which different
cues are learned about when presented together. Participants appear to protect existing
theories about the causal status of cues, instead attributing unexpected outcomes to cues
about which they do not hold a strong theory. These findings cannot be accounted for by
either individual (e.g.  Bush & Mosteller,  1951) or overall  (e.g.  Rescorla & Wagner,
1972) prediction error, or a hybrid of both (e.g. Rescorla, 2001). This is because in each
experiment there was greater learning about the cue with the smaller prediction error.
Experiments 6 and 7 cannot be accounted for by Mackintosh’s (1975) attentional model,
since according to this  model there should have been no prediction error for cue B
during Stage 2, and hence no learning. Experiments 6 and 7 also cannot be accounted
for by Pearce and Hall’s (1980) attentional model, since the associability of both A and
B should have been equally low at the end of Stage 1, resulting in equal learning during
Stage  2.  Furthermore,  Experiment  7  provides  direct  evidence  of  a  difference  in
participants’ confidence before the compound training stage, supporting the idea that
participants will protect their theory about a cue if they are confident about it. These
data  are  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Chapter  2,  in  their  support  of  the  theory
protection account. 
The experiments reported here also address the point raised in Chapter 2, in that cues
given high and low causal ratings might  differ in  their  associability changes,  in the
confines of the Mackintosh (1975) attentional account. In the three experiments reported
in Chapter 2, a cue that was given low causal ratings during Stage 1, and a causally-
ambiguous  cue  that  was  given  intermediate  causal  ratings  during  Stage  1,  were
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presented in a compound during Stage 2. The compound was always followed by the
outcome. In each experiment, participants learned more about the causally-ambiguous
cue  during  Stage  2,  apparently  protecting  their  theory  about  the  cues  they  had
previously  assigned  low  causal  ratings.  It  was  suggested  that  this  could  be  a
consequence of cues that are assigned lower ratings acquiring associability at a slower
rate than those that are assigned higher ratings. This explanation is not viable for the
experiments in Chapter 3, since the causally-ambiguous cue was always trained during
Stage 2 with a cue that was predictive of stomach ache in Stage 1. Participants still
learned more about the causally-ambiguous cue in each experiment, even though this
cue was never a good predictor of stomach ache.
In the Chapter 2 General Discussion (2.5), differences were outlined between Pearce
and Hall’s (1980) model and the theory protection account. In the case of the theory
protection account, future learning is influenced by knowledge about the cues, whilst in
the case of Pearce and Hall’s model,  learning is influenced by surprisingness of the
outcome (as this governs any update in associability for all cues that are present). This
outcome-directed nature of Pearce and Hall’s model is what prevents it from explaining
Experiments 6 and 7, since this makes it insensitive to the negative associative strength
acquired by B during Stage 1, which is central to the difference in learning (about A and
B) according to the theory protection account. If one interprets the negative intermediate
Probe Test rating in Experiment 7 as a lack of confidence about B being neutral or
preventative, then there is scope for greater learning about B during Stage 2. This idea
could be tested further by conducting another version of the experiment with a second
group,  in  which  B- is  explicitly  trained as  inhibitory (i.e.  preventative).  The theory
protection account predicts that greater learning about B compared to A should not be
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observed in  this  second group,  resulting in  a  between-group difference.  Conversely,
Pearce and Hall’s model predicts  no difference between the groups because all cues
should  decline  in  associability  to  an  equal  extent,  since  all  trials  have  predictable
outcomes. 
Despite the two influential attentional models discussed above (Mackintosh, 1975 and
Pearce & Hall, 1980) failing to account for the full set of experiments in Chapters 2 and
3, this does not mean that attention may not play some role in explaining the current
results. There are more recent attentional accounts worthy of future investigation, such
as EXIT (Kruschke, 2001), Locally Bayesian Learning (Kruschke, 2006), or the hybrid
model  proposed  by  Le  Pelley  (2004).  For  example,  the  two  models  proposed  by
Kruschke retain the essence of Mackintosh’s account (i.e. a non-recurrent associative
model in which there is re-allocation of attention to the best predictors) but differ in
other respects. Thus, the failure of Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce and Hall (1980) to
accommodate the results of Experiments 6 and 7 does not necessarily imply that other
models would also fail. More broadly, there is no obvious theoretical reason why theory
protection and attention should be mutually  exclusive processes when attempting to
construct a formal model. For example, the attention participants pay to cues may vary
depending on how confident participants are about the causal status of those cues.
While  discussing  theory  protection  in  the  context  of  the  present  experiments,  the
predominant emphasis has been on participants protecting their theory about A during
Stage 2. However, as briefly suggested in the previous section, participants should still
hold  a  theory  about  B.  However,  this  theory  would  be  a  more  flexible  one  that
encompasses  a  range  of  causal  statuses.  For  example,  in  Experiments  4  and  5,
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participants will know that cue B could either be causal, neutral or preventative before
the first presentation of feedback in Stage 2. Therefore, learning that B is preventative,
following Stage 2 feedback, allows participants to protect an aspect of this theory about
B  with  relative  confidence.  This  suggestion  might  at  first  seem  tangential,  but  it
illustrates an important point about how theory protection might operate more broadly.
Learning that  B is  preventative of  the  outcome during Stage 2,  does  not  contradict
anything already known about B from Stage 1. For example, if B was instead trained as
a blocked cue during Stage 1, participants should be unconfident about whether it is
causal  or  neutral,  but  they  should  learn  that  it  is  not  preventative  of  the  outcome
(because the outcome still occurs following the presentation of compounds containing a
blocked cue). In such a design, participants would be unable to protect their existing
theories about both A and B during AB- trials, since their existing knowledge about
these cues would be inconsistent with the absence of the outcome. In Experiments 6 and
7, the data suggest that participants (prior to Stage 2) hold a theory that B is not a cause,
but might be neutral or inhibitory. Therefore, participants can protect their theory that B
is  not  a  cause  during  Stage  2,  while  acquiring  a  more  constrained theory that  it  is
preventative. Again, learning that B is preventative during Stage 2 matches what they
already know about B from Stage 1. Therefore, being unconfident about the status of a
cue should only facilitate learning, if the range of causal statuses that cue could hold
matches the subsequently experienced outcome. 
This concept of matched (i.e. consistent) statuses and outcomes in theory protection is
important for two reasons. Firstly, as already outlined above, as it raises the question of
what might happen when an outcome is not consistent with the existing theories held
about  each cue in a  compound. To provide another example,  if  a previously-trained
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neutral cue and an inhibitor were presented in a compound that was followed by the
outcome,  the  occurrence  of  this  outcome would  not  be  consistent  with  the  existing
theories held about either cue. When participants are unable to protect their existing
theories,  it  is  possible  that  learning  might  more  closely  resemble  that  predicted  by
prediction error accounts (e.g. Rescorla, 2001). This idea has yet to be tested, and seems
a worthwhile avenue for future research. Secondly, as outlined in the Chapter 2 General
Discussion (2.5), theory protection should still operate in instances where there is no
difference in participants’ confidence about the causal status of two cues being trained
in compound (e.g. Le Pelley & McLaren, 2001). In such circumstances,  participants
should learn more about a cue, if its current causal status matches the outcome it is
subsequently trained in compound with. The concept of matched statuses and outcomes
in theory protection is discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.
The experimental scenario may also be important in influencing the type of theories
participants form about cues. Theory protection in the Chapter 3 experiments relied on
participants believing that B might be preventative, prior to receiving feedback in Stage
2. If participants do not believe that B can be an inhibitor then the opposite result should
be observed, since participants would have no option but to revise their belief that A is
causal.  One  way  in  which  this  idea  could  be  tested  is  by  varying  the  instructions
provided to participants to manipulate their beliefs about cues. For example, participants
could  be  presented  with  an experimental  scenario  in  which cues  are  unlikely  to  be
preventative.  Haselgrove  and  Evans  (2010)  implemented  a  similar  design  to
Experiments 6 and 7, using a scenario in which the cues were different foods and the
outcome was a stomach ache. There were also some minor differences to their design,
such as two additional compounds in the initial training stage. One of these resulted in
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stomach ache,  while the other  resulted in  no stomach ache.  There was also another
compound alongside AB- in the subsequent training stage, which resulted in no stomach
ache.  Additionally,  their  experiment  compared two groups of participants,  with high
versus low scores on a measure of schizotypy. Unlike chemicals, foods are not generally
regarded as something that can become preventative of an allergic reaction (Zaksaite &
Jones, 2019). Consequently, participants should simply learn that B is neutral during the
initial training stage. During subsequent AB- training, participants would be unable to
attribute the absence of the outcome to B, and should therefore be forced to revise their
theory that A is a cause of the outcome, perhaps in a manner consistent with individual
prediction error. The results of Haselgrove and Evans (2010) support this view, as a
compound test revealed more learning about A than B. However, it should be noted that
this difference was significant in the high schizotypy group, but not the low schizotypy
group.  It  would  be  useful  to  simplify  this  experiment,  by  dropping  the  schizotypy
element,  in order  focus specifically  on the effect of using food cues,  as opposed to
chemicals. This idea could be tested more directly in a between-groups experiment, in
which the scenario and instructions are varied so that inhibition is encouraged in one
group, but not the other. 
Similarly to Chapter 2, the Test stage data reported in this chapter provided plots of
inter-subject  variability.  As before,  these plots  suggest that  a substantial  minority  of
participants may be behaving in a way consistent with prediction error accounts (i.e.
they individually have an AD-BC difference that is  zero or negative).  Again,  future
research  might  examine  this  issue  in  more  detail,  to  look  for  stable  individual
differences in how associations are formed.
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As  a  final  point,  the  addition  of  the  Probe  Test  and  Forced  Choice  highlights  an
interesting issue concerning the best method of assessing predictive learning in humans.
Typically, human predictive learning experiments (e.g. Spicer at al., 2019; Jones et al.,
2019) ask participants to indicate the likelihood of the outcome, as a way of measuring
learning. Our Probe Test instead asked participants specifically what they thought each
cues does. This kind of approach might be a better test, in the case of predictive learning
tasks  more  broadly,  as  it  is  sensitive  to  differences  in  causal  status  that  outcome
likelihood measurements are not. In the case of Experiment 7, the Probe Test allowed
for  differences  between neutral  cues  and preventative cues  to be demonstrated with
individual ratings; something not possible when measuring outcome likelihood. More
broadly,  if  cues can acquire negative associative strength,  then it  seems sensible for
testing scales to incorporate a negative dimension as a standard feature.
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4.1: Representing Uncertainty
Chapters  2  and  3  provide  experimental  evidence  of  theory  protection  playing  an
important role in human associative learning. Differences in participants’ confidence
about the causal status of cues was suggested as a way in which theory protection might
operate. Specifically, if participants are less confident, then they should hold a weaker
theory. The focus of this chapter is different, although there are some related themes.
Firstly, there is a focus on individual and overall prediction error, cue competition, and
the  redundancy  effect.  These  learning  phenomena  are  formally  investigated  in  this
chapter,  using computational model fitting.  Secondly,  there is a proposed method of
formally  implementing  participants’ lack  of  confidence  (i.e.  uncertainty)  within  the
confines of an established model of learning; the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model
(N.B.  popularly  referred  to  as  the  Rescorla-Wagner  model).  This  mathematical
representation  of  uncertainty  is  specific  to  novel  cues  (i.e.  cues  not  previously
encountered in learning scenarios). This chapter does not focus specifically on theory
protection. However, Chapter 5 suggests future avenues for research, with a particular
focus on how a formal model of theory protection might be developed. 
When formally modelling animal learning, the associative strengths of previously non-
encountered  cues  typically  start  at  zero  (e.g.  Rescorla  &  Wagner,  1972).  When
equivalently modelling human learning, it has been assumed that associative strengths
should similarly start at zero. It has also been assumed that the Rescorla and Wagner
(1972) model adequately accommodates the results of simple blocking experiments in
humans (e.g.  Dickinson,  Shanks,  & Evenden,  1984),  whilst  the Bush and Mosteller
(1951) model cannot. The simulations presented in this chapter demonstrate that both of
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these assumptions are wrong. The Rescorla-Wagner model, as usually applied, fits the
results  of  a  simple  blocking  experiment  no  better  than  Bush  & Mosteller’s  (1951)
model.  However,  if  the  Rescorla-Wagner  model  is  modified,  so  that  the  initial
associative strengths of cues can be an intermediate value, rather than zero, then the
model  does  indeed  provide  a  better  account  of  simple  blocking  data  than  the
(equivalently modified) Bush and Mosteller model. This modification also allows the
Rescorla-Wagner model to account for a redundancy effect (e.g. Uengoer et al., 2013)
experiment; something that the unmodified model is not able to do. Furthermore, the
modified Rescorla-Wagner model can accommodate the effect of varying the proportion
of trials on which the outcome occurs (i.e. the base rate) on the redundancy effect (Jones
et al., 2019). Interestingly, the initial associative strength of cues varies in line with the
outcome base rate. The key proposal of this chapter is that this modification provides a
simple way of mathematically representing uncertainty about the causal status of novel
cues within the confines of the Rescorla-Wagner model. The theoretical implications of
this modification are discussed. Free and open resources to support formal modelling in
associative learning are introduced.
As discussed in Chapter 2, blocking (Kamin, 1969) is the most widely known type of
cue  competition  in  associative  learning.  Learning  about  blocked  cues  is  apparently
restricted  by  the  simultaneous  presence  of  another  cue  that  has  also  been  trained
separately (e.g. cue X from an A+ AX+ design). Blocking has long been of interest to
associative learning researchers. Early models of associative learning were unable to
account  for  it.  In  particular,  the associative  learning model  developed by Bush and
Mosteller (1951) uses an individual prediction error, which means that any change in
the strength of an association between a cue and an outcome is governed by the size of
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the error between the outcome that occurs and the outcome predicted by that cue alone.
For  example,  if  you  predict  that  a  certain  type  of  food  is  safe  to  eat,  but  you
subsequently suffer an allergic reaction after eating that food, then there will be a large
prediction error. Once you have learned that this type of food is not safe to eat, there
will be no error, and learning will be at asymptote. According to the Bush and Mosteller
model, learning updates algorithmically as follows:
∆Vx = αxL(λ–Vx) (1)
In  Equation  1,  associative  strength  is  denoted  by  V,  where  ∆Vx is  the  change  in
associative strength for cue X, and Vx is the current associative strength of cue X. The
cue salience is represented by α and the outcome learning rate is represented by L. The
asymptote of learning is represented by λ. The individual prediction error term means
that the model cannot account for blocking, as this effect is driven by the interference of
simultaneously  encountered  cues.  To  overcome  this,  Rescorla  and  Wagner  (1972)
proposed  their  model  with  an  overall  prediction  error,  in  which  any  change  in
associative strength is governed by the error between the outcome that occurs and the
outcome predicted by all simultaneously present cues. The equation is as follows:
∆Vx = αxL(λ–ΣV)V) (2)
The only change is that ΣV)V has been incorporated as the overall associative strength of
all  simultaneously-present  cues.  Such  cues  compete  for  the  available  associative
strength, allowing the model to account for blocking. This is because A takes up all the
available  associative  strength  on  the  A+  trials,  meaning  that  there  is  no  available
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associative  strength  for  X  to  acquire  on  the  AX+  trials  (assuming  learning  is  at
asymptote).  In other words, X is left with nothing to account for, as outcome on the
AX+ trials is fully predicted by A.
Dickinson et al. (1984) provided one of the first demonstrations of blocking in humans.
As  stated,  the  Rescorla-Wagner  model  is  widely  assumed  to  provide  an  adequate
explanation of such human blocking experiments, whilst also providing a better account
than Bush and Mosteller’s model. The design Dickinson et al. (1984) employed was as
follows:  training  trials  containing  cue  A were  presented  in  the  first  stage  of  the
experiment,  while  the  trials  containing  the  AX+  compound  were  presented  in  a
subsequent stage (forward blocking). In the first simulation reported in this chapter, a
model  fitting  procedure  was  conducted  on  the  full  data  of  a  simple  forward  cue
competition  blocking  experiment,  using  both  the  Rescorla-Wagner,  and  Bush  and
Mosteller models. It is worth emphasising that the ability of the models to account for
the full set of experimental test cues was explored, rather than just the blocked cue and
the control cue. In other words, a sufficiently adequate model should be able to account
for a full experiment, rather than just accounting for an effect, which is only an extract
of an experiment. Neither model provided an adequate account of the full test data, with
the  Rescorla-Wagner  model’s  overall  fit  to  the  data  being  no better  than  Bush and
Mosteller’s model.
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4.2: Model fitting 1: blocking
There are several simple human forward cue competition experiments reported in the
literature (e.g. Dickinson et al., 1984; Miller, 1996; Mitchell & Lovibond, 2002), but
none of these datasets appear to have been made openly accessible. In order to provide
an openly accessible set of simple blocking data, a standard forward cue competition
experiment was conducted. The design included blocking (A+ AX+), a common control
(B- BY+), and filler cues intended to balance the number of cue types causing either
stomach ache  or  no stomach ache (C- CD-).  The full  details  of  the  experiment  are
included in the next section of this chapter, followed by details about the model fitting
procedure.
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4.2.2: Blocking experimental details (Experiment 8)
Consistent with a number of previous human learning experiments (e.g. Uengoer et al.,
2013; Jones et al., 2019), this experiment used a food allergy scenario. Participants were
provided with a fictional situation, in which they played the role of a medical doctor,
trying to ascertain which foods cause a stomach ache in a patient. During the training
trials, participants were presented with a series of different foods, either singly or in
pairs. They were asked to predict whether or not the fictional patient would experience a
stomach ache after eating these foods. After participants had made their prediction, they
were  provided  with  feedback  as  to  whether  or  not  a  stomach  ache  occurred.  Once
participants  had  completed  training,  they  were  tested  by  being  asked  to  make  a
likelihood rating indicating how likely they thought a stomach ache would be after the
patient ate specific foods.
Table 4. The design Experiment 8
Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
A+   
B-   
C-
AX+   
BY+  
CD-
A   D
B   X
C   Y 
The experimental design is shown in Table 4. The Stage 1 training consisted of three
single cues, one of which was followed by the outcome (A+), and two of which were
followed  by  the  absence  of  the  outcome (B-  C-).  The  subsequent  Stage  2  training
consisted of three compounds, each of which contained one cue from Stage 1. Two of
these compounds were followed by the outcome (AX+ BY+), and one was followed by
the absence of the outcome (CD-). As outlined in the chapter introduction, X was added
as  the  blocked  cue,  while  Y was  added  as  a  control  (known  as  a  feature  positive
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control). If X is judged to be a less likely cause of the outcome at test than Y, then this
provides  evidence of blocking.  The individual  cue C- and the compound CD- were
added as filler  cues,  so that an equal number of trial  types were followed by either
stomach ache or no stomach ache across the two training stages.
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Method
Participants
Forty-one  psychology students  from the University  of  Plymouth  participated  in  this
experiment, in return for course credit (31 female, 10 male; mean age = 19.59, SD =
1.41).  This  sample  size  has  adequate  power to  detect  medium-sized  within-subjects
effects  (88% power  at  d  =  0.5).  People  who  had  previously  taken  part  in  similar
experiments were excluded from this study, to ensure that participants were naive to the
purpose of the experiment. 
Materials
Participants  were  all  tested  in  the  same  lab  at  the  University  of  Plymouth.  The
experiment  was  conducted  using  Viglen  Genie  desktop  computers,  running  the
Windows 10 operating system. The computers all used 22-inch Phillips LED displays,
with participants at a typical distance (of approximately 40-80 cm) from the screen. The
experiment  was designed and executed in  the Psychopy desktop application version
1.85.2 (Peirce, 2007). Participants made their responses by pressing keys on a standard
UK computer keyboard during the training stages, and by using mouse clicks during the
test stage. The six individual cue types were represented on screen as photographs of
fruits: apple, banana, kiwi, orange, pear, and plum. All the fruits were presented within a
white square. The dimensions of each cue (including the white square) were 300 x 300
pixels, with a screen resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels. For each participant, the foods
were  randomly  assigned  to  each  cue  (A,  B,  C,  D,  X,  and  Y).  The  two  outcomes,
‘stomach  ache’ and  ‘no  stomach  ache’,  were  represented  by  text  on  screen  and  a
105
photograph of a man clutching his stomach, or a man giving a ‘thumbs up’, respectively.
The outcome images were presented within a white rectangle. The dimensions of the
outcome images (including the white rectangle) were 291 x 332 pixels. All experimental
text, including instructions, was white. A black background was used throughout the
experiment. Study information sheets, consent forms and debrief forms were all printed
on paper.
Design
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 4. During Stage 1,
participants were presented with twelve blocks of training. The three trial types (A+, B-,
C-) were presented once within each block, and in a random order. During Stage 2,
participants  were presented  with six  blocks  of  training.  The three trial  types  (AX+,
BY+, CD-) were presented once within each block, and in a random order. During the
Test stage, participants were presented with ten blocks of test cues. The purpose of this
extended Test stage, was to allow these data to potentially be used for model fitting at
the level of individual participants (N.B. this is not the intention of the current project).
The six trial types (A, B, C, D, X, Y) were presented once within each block, and in a
random order. 
 
Procedure
Participants were required to read an information sheet and sign a consent form prior to
participating in the experiment.  The experimental instructions were presented on the
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screen at the start of the experiment. They were adapted from Uengoer et al. (2013) and
were as follows:
This study is concerned with the way in which people learn about relationships between
events. In the present case, you should learn whether the consumption of certain foods
leads to stomach ache or not. 
Imagine  that  you  are  a  medical  doctor.  One  of  your  patients  often  suffers  from a
stomach ache after eating. To identify which foods they react to, the patient eats specific
foods and observes whether a stomach ache occurs or not. The results of these tests are
shown to you on the screen one after the other. 
You  will  always  be  told  what  your  patient  has  eaten.  Sometimes,  they  have  only
consumed a single kind of food and on other times they have consumed two different
foods. Please look at the foods carefully.
You will then be asked to predict whether the patient suffers from stomach ache. For
this prediction, please click on the appropriate response button. After you have made
your  prediction,  you  will  be  informed  whether  your  patient  actually  suffered  from
stomach ache. Use this feedback to find out what foods cause a stomach ache in your
patient. 
At first you will have to guess the outcome because you do not know anything about
your patient. But eventually you will learn which foods lead to stomach ache in this
patient and you will be able to make correct predictions. 
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For all of your answers, accuracy rather than speed is essential. Please do not take any
notes during the experiment. If you have any more questions, please ask them now. 
If you do not have any questions, please start the experiment by pressing the space bar.
For each trial during the training stages, the cues were presented visually on either the
left- or right-hand side of the screen. Since only one image was presented on each trial
in Stage 1, the opposite side of the screen contained a blank space, matching the black
background. The cues were randomly assigned to either the left- or right-hand position
on each trial. Text at the top of the screen stated that ‘The patient eats the following:’,
with the stimuli presented below this. Underneath the stimuli, further text stated ‘Which
outcome  do  you  expect?  Please  use  your  keyboard  to  respond’.  Participants  were
instructed to  respond by pressing the appropriate  key on their  keyboard;  Z for ‘No
Stomach Ache’ and M for ‘Stomach Ache’. After participants made their response, the
feedback for that trial  was shown. The feedback screen consisted of the appropriate
outcome image along with its accompanying text, indicating either ‘Stomach Ache’ or
‘No Stomach Ache’. The feedback was shown on screen for two seconds, after which
the next trial began. 
Following the completion of Stage 1, Stage 2 started with no trial break, so that this was
a seamless continuation of the training from the perspective of participants. As in Stage
1, the cues were randomised on each trial to appear on either the left- or right-hand side
of the screen. Since two cues were presented on each trial, there was no need for a blank
space  to  be  presented  during  this  stage.  The on-screen  text  and responding via  the
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keyboard was the same as in Stage 1. The process for displaying the trial feedback was
also the same.
After  the  completion  of  Stage  2,  a  further  instruction  screen  was  shown  before
commencement of the Test stage:
Now, your task is to judge the probability with which specific foods cause stomach ache
in your patient. Single foods will be shown to you on the screen.
In this part of the experiment, you will receive no feedback about the actual reaction of
the patient. Use the information that you have collected so far, to make your rating.
Press the space bar to continue.
For each trial during the Test stage, the cues were presented on either the left- or right-
hand side of the screen. When only one image was presented, the opposite side of the
screen again contained a blank space. The cues were randomly assigned to either the left
or right position on each trial. As before, text at the top of the screen stated that ‘The
patient  eats  the  following:’,  with  the  stimuli  presented  below  this.  Underneath  the
stimuli, further text stated ‘How likely are they to suffer a stomach ache? (0 = Very
Unlikely; 10 = Very Likely)’. Participants were instructed to respond by clicking on an
eleven-point rating scale using their mouse pointer, to indicate how likely they thought
the occurrence of a stomach ache would be. The rating scale was located in the lower
part  of  the  screen,  with  the  11-point  scale  running from left  to  right,  in  ascending
numerical order. After participants made their response, a black screen appeared for 0.4
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secs,  after  which  the  next  trial  was  presented.  Following  the  completion  of  the
experiment, participants were provided with a debrief form. 
Analysis
The data were processed and analysed using R (R Core Team, 2018). The difference
between cues X and Y (i.e. to test for blocking) was assessed using a paired-samples t-
test. The alpha level was set to p < .05. A Bayesian t-test was also conducted, using the
procedure recommended by Dienes (2011) and implemented as R code by Baguley and
Kaye (2010).  Due to  methodological  differences  among  previous  demonstrations  of
forward cue-competition in humans, it was difficult to choose a specific experiment on
which to base a prior. Therefore, a uniform distribution was specified, with a lower limit
of  -10 and an upper  limit  of 10 (in  terms of the mean difference between ratings),
because this is the largest difference between ratings permitted by an 11-point scale. In
keeping with accepted conventions (e.g. Jeffreys, 1961), a Bayes factor of over three
was set as the level providing evidence for a difference, while a Bayes factor of less
than  one  third  was  set  as  the  level  providing  evidence  for  no  difference.  A value
between these levels was accepted as being inconclusive.
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Results and Discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/sa8ux/. The descriptive statistics for the Experiment 8 training stages are
shown in Figure 16.  The Stage  1 data  indicate  that  participants  learned sufficiently
about the three different cues by the time this stage was complete. Similarly, the Stage 2
data indicate that participants learned sufficiently about the three different compounds
by the time training was complete.
Figure 16. Experiment 8 Stage 1 and 2 data.
Descriptive statistics for the Experiment 1 Test Stage are shown in Figures 18 and 19,
along  with  the  model  fitting  data  (see  next  section).  Mean  ratings  for  X  were
significantly lower than for Y;  t(40) = 6.77,  p  < .001 ,  BF =  5.66 x 108,  d = 1.06,
indicating  a  successful  demonstration  of  blocking.  Figure  17  shows  inter-subject
variability on the key test difference. As would be expected from the mean test ratings,
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most individual participants rated X lower than Y, although the variability did extend to
some participants assigning a lower rating to Y.
Figure  17.  Inter-subject  variability  on  the  key  Y-X  difference  using  a  method
comparable to Hintze & Nelson (1998). Each dot is one participant, with jitter applied
for readability. The boxplot shows the median and interquartile range.
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4.2.3: Blocking model fitting details
A model fitting process was conducted on the data for all test stage cues. The model
fitting was conducted using standard implementations of the Bush and Mosteller (1951)
model and the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model. The fitting code for this specific
simulation  is  available  at  https://osf.io/sa8ux/.  Following  standard  practice,  the
procedure used gradient-descent optimisation to find the best fitting parameters. This
process involves exploring the parameter space, to minimise the difference (represented
by the sum of squared errors) between the observed and predicted mean test ratings. It
was necessary for each model to generate ratings consistent with the outcome likelihood
scale  (between  0  and  10)  used  at  test,  rather  than  just  output  associative  strengths
(typically between 0 and 1). As outlined in Chapter 1, it is generally accepted that there
is not a 1:1 linear relationship between associative strengths and responding (e.g. Gluck
& Bower, 1988), although as one increases so should the other. A standard solution to
this problem is to use a logistic function to map associative strengths onto responses.
The equation below is the logistic function suggested by Gluck and Bower:
Px=10
1
1+e−Ɵ (V x−β )
                                                                                                        (3)
Px denotes the simulated likelihood rating for cue X, while Vx denotes the associative
strength. β (Beta) denotes the bias parameter for the output associative strength that will
result in a rating of 5 (i.e. the middle of the scale). Ɵ (Theta) is a scaling parameter,
where higher values mean that the function relating activation to rating becomes less
linear and more logistic. At high values it produces a step function. It should be noted
that this function was originally proposed as a way of mapping associative strengths
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onto choice probabilities in category learning. However, predictive learning tasks, such
of those reported in this thesis rely on participants making a probabilistic choice, in
terms of  whether  an  outcome will  occur  or  not.  As the  probability  (i.e.  likelihood)
ratings  participants  make  are  an  indication  of  underlying  associative  strength,  this
function provides an appropriate way of mapping this  relationship.  Indeed, Rescorla
(2001)  describes  such  a  logistic  (i.e.  sigmoidal)  function  for  mapping  associative
strength  onto  responding,  although  does  not  suggest  a  formal  implementation.  As
outlined  in  the  introduction  to  this  chapter,  both  models  require  cue  salience  and
learning rate as their  two standard parameters. Both of these parameters can have a
value between 0 and 1. Since these values are multiplied in the learning algorithm, the
resulting  product  is  necessarily  a  value  between  0  and  1.  For  simplicity,  these
parameters were collapsed into a single learning rate parameter (LR). Therefore, the
parameter space being explored consisted of LR, Beta and Theta. The value of each
parameter  was  the  same  for  all  cues,  since  the  counterbalancing  of  stimuli  in  the
experimental design meant there was no theoretical basis for expecting these values to
differ between cues.
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Results from standard model implementations
The code for producing the model fitting outputs is available at https://osf.io/sa8ux/. An
optimisation process was conducted on the blocking data, in which the parameter space
for the two models was explored (using the optim function of R) to find the best fitting
parameters.  The  difference  between  the  predicted  and  observed  test  ratings,  as
represented by sum of squared errors (SSE) was minimised in order to find the closest
fit.  The  training  that  each  experimental  participant  received  was  represented  as  a
training matrix,  which was passed to each model,  so that  the simulated participants
received  the  ‘same  training’  as  the  experimental  participants.  The  model
implementations  are  part  of  the  catlearn  (Wills,  Dome,  Edmunds,  Honke,  Inkster,
Schlegelmilch,  &  Spicer,  2019)  package  in  R.  The  Rescorla  and  Wagner  (1972)
implementation is called slpRW, and the Bush and Mosteller (1951) implementation is
called  slpBM. The function for defining the relationship between associative strength
and  responding  is  also  available  in  catlearn  and  is  called  act2probrat  (this  is  an
implementation  of  Equation  3). The  best  fitting  parameters  for  the  standard
(unmodified) implementations of the Rescorla-Wagner, and Bush and Mosteller models
are reported in Table 5. The learning rate is reported as LR, whilst Beta and Theta are
the parameters that define the relationship between associative strength and responding.
The sum of squared errors (SSE) and the mean error (i.e. for each cue) are reported,
along  with  the  adequacy  of  fit  (R2).  Both  models  provided  an  equally  inadequate
account of the blocking test data.
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Table 5. Output of unmodified model fitting on blocking data
Model LR Beta Theta SSE
Mean
Error
R2
BM 0.04 0.21 13.41 0.24 0.08 0.71
RW 0.01 0.04 75.81 0.24 0.08 0.71
The best  fitting model  should produce the smallest  error between the predicted and
observed test ratings. This was assessed using the mean error for each of the six test
cues. The adequacy of fit for each model was additionally assessed with the R2 of the
predicted versus observed ratings (this is a standard correlation co-efficient, and hence a
higher value means a better adequacy of fit). Both the Bush and Mosteller model, and
the Rescorla-Wagner model produced an equivalent mean error and R2. To put the R2
value  in  context,  the  best  formal  models  of  category  learning  produce  R2 values
exceeding .95 for standard results in the field, with models that are clearly and ordinally
wrong still sometimes producing R2 values exceeding 85% (Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri,
McKinley, & Glauthier, 1994). On this basis, both the Rescorla-Wagner, and Bush and
Mosteller models provide rather poor accounts of this basic blocking experiment.
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Figure  18.  Predicted  versus  observed  Test  stage  ratings  for  unmodified  Rescorla-
Wagner (RW) model, and Bush & Mosteller (BM) model, against observed data (Obs),
following A+/AX+ B-/BY+ C-/CD- training. The violin plot represents the distribution
of  the  observed  data  using  a  method comparable  to  Hintze  & Nelson  (1998).  The
distribution of the predicted data is not represented, as it was negligible.
Figure 18 shows the predicted versus observed test cue ratings for both models. The
unmodified Rescorla-Wagner model provides no better an account of the blocking data
than the Bush and Mosteller model. The Bush and Mosteller model cannot capture these
data, because B, X and Y caused stomach ache on an equal number of Stage 2 training
trials, so learning should be equal according to individual prediction error. However, the
Rescorla-Wagner model also predicts equal learning about B and Y, since they would
equally  account  for  the  occurrence  of  stomach  ache  during  the  BY+  trials.  The
Rescorla-Wagner model fitted X, but at the cost of getting B and Y wrong in opposing
directions. The difference between X and Y was under-predicted. This could either be
interpreted as an under-prediction of the blocking effect itself, or as an inability of the
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model  to  capture  protection  from overshadowing (i.e.  the  effect  of  the  B- trials  on
responding to Y).
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4.2.4: Modifying the Rescorla-Wagner model
The Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model was originally developed as an account of non-
human animal learning. In that context, it makes sense for the associative strength of
cues to start at zero, because animals such as rats would not have learned a response to
cues not previously encountered. However, in a human predictive learning context, it
seems unlikely that a novel cue would have an associative strength of zero.  This is
because participants would be learning whether or not such cues are the cause of an
outcome, and an associative strength of zero should result  in the production of low
causal ratings. A more intuitive response would be for participants to provide novel cues
with an intermediate rating (for example 5 on a scale running from 0-10), reflecting
their uncertainty about the causal status of those cues. This is supported by the results of
Experiment 4, in which the novel cue at test (D) was assigned an intermediate rating of
4.85 on the 0-10 likelihood scale. The model fitting procedure was therefore conducted
on the blocking data a second time, using modified versions of the models, in which the
initial associative strength of cues was an additional parameter for optimisation. As with
the other parameters, the initial associative strength was the same for all cues, since
there was no theoretical basis for expecting any differences. The fitting code for this
simulation is available at https://osf.io/sa8ux/.
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Results from modified model implementations
The best  fitting parameters  for  these modified  implementations  of  the  Rescorla  and
Wagner (1972), and Bush and Mosteller (1951) models are reported in Table 6. The best
fitting initial associative strength (Init Assoc) is reported as the additional parameter.
The predicted versus observed ratings for these best fitting parameters are reported in
Figure 19.
Table 6. Output of modified model fitting on blocking data
Model LR
Init
Assoc
Beta Theta SSE
Mean
Error
R2
BM (modified) 0.02 0.45 0.49 30.52 0.06 0.04 0.93
RW (modified) 0.04 0.43 0.41 19.31 0.00 0.01 1.00
If the Rescorla-Wagner model is modified so that the starting associative strength can be
something other than zero, then it accounts for the results of the blocking experiment
better than the equivalently modified Bush and Mosteller (1951) model, as indicated by
the mean error and R2 values. The Rescorla-Wagner model produces less error and has a
better adequacy of fit. Whilst the modified Bush and Mosteller model provided a better
fit than the unmodified version, the lack of an overall error term does not allow it to
predict blocking.
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Figure 19. Predicted versus observed Test stage ratings for modified Rescorla-Wagner
(RW)  model,  and  Bush  &  Mosteller  (BM)  model,  against  observed  data  (Obs),
following A+/AX+ B-/BY+ C-/CD- training. The violin plot represents the distribution
of the observed data.
As predicted, the best fitting initial associative strengths were at an intermediate value
for both models. This finding is consistent with the idea that participants should assign
intermediate ratings to cues that have an unknown causal status.
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4.3: Model fitting 2: redundancy effect
The next step was to investigate whether the modified Rescorla-Wagner model could
adequately  capture  a  further  psychological  phenomenon  that  the  unmodified  model
cannot; the redundancy effect (e.g. Jones & Zaksaite, 2018; Jones et al., 2019; Uengoer,
Lotz, & Pearce, 2013; Uengoer, Dwyer, Koenig, & Pearce, 2019). Recall from Chapter
2 that the training stage of a redundancy effect design incorporates blocking (A+ AX+)
and a simple discrimination (BY+ CY-). Cue Y is referred to as an uncorrelated cue,
because  it  appears  in  both  a  causal  compound  and  a  non-causal  compound.  The
redundancy effect is the observation of X being rated as a more likely cause of the
outcome than Y. The blocked cue (X) is typically given intermediate causal ratings at
test, while the uncorrelated cue (Y) is typically given low causal ratings.
Rather than using a previously published data set, a new redundancy effect experiment
was conducted, in order to provide suitable data. The motivation for collecting new data
was a need for a more diagnostic test stage than simply asking participants to provide
likelihood  ratings  for  the  five  single  cues  (A,  B,  C,  X,  Y).  In  addition  to  asking
participants to provide likelihood ratings for the five single cues at test, they were also
asked to provide ratings for each of the ten possible compound cue pairs (that can be
produced  using  these  five  individual  cues).  Importantly,  the  training  participants
received  was  equivalent  to  the  training  used  in  previous  redundancy  effect
demonstrations (A+ AX+ CY+ CY-). However, having a wider set of cues in the test
Stage meant that the two models could be ‘stretched’, by being required to fit a more
complex set of test data. The fitting code for this simulation is available at https://osf.io/
9vaby/.
122
4.3.2: Redundancy effect experimental details (Experiment 9)
This experiment used the same scenario as Experiment 8. The presentation of the cues
and feedback was the same, as was the responding by the participants. The experimental
design  is  shown in  Table  7.  The Stage  1 training  consisted  of  a  simple  intermixed
blocking design (A+ AX+), along with a simple intermixed discrimination (BY+ CY-).
If X is judged as a more likely cause of the outcome than Y at test, then this provides
evidence of the redundancy effect.
Table 7. The design of Experiment 9
Stage 1 Test
A+   
AX+   
BY+
CY-
A   AB   BX
B   AC   BY
C   AX   CX
X   AY   CY
Y   BC   XY
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Method
Participants
Forty  psychology  students  from  the  University  of  Plymouth  participated  in  this
experiment, in return for course credit (33 female, 7 male; mean age = 20.95, SD =
5.30).  This  sample  size  has  adequate  power to  detect  medium-sized  within-subjects
effects  (87% power  at  d  =  0.5).  People  who  had  previously  taken  part  in  similar
experiments were excluded from this study, to ensure that participants were naive to the
purpose of the experiment.
Materials
The Experiment 9 materials were the same as those used in Experiment 8, although a
different version of Psychopy was used; 1.83.04 (Peirce, 2007). Additionally, a slightly
different set of photographs (apple, banana, orange, pear, and strawberry) was used to
represent the five individual cue types (A, B, C, X, and Y).
Design
The experiment used a within-subjects design, as outlined in Table 7. During Stage 1,
participants were presented with four epochs of training. The four trial types (A+, AX+,
BY+, CY-) were presented twice within each epoch. The reason why each trial type was
presented twice was so that each of the two possible left-right cue configurations was
counterbalanced.  The trial  types  were presented in  a random order.  During the Test
stage,  participants  were presented with six epochs of test  cues.  The purpose of  this
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extended Test stage, was to allow this data to potentially be used for model fitting at the
level of individual participants (N.B. this is not the intention of the current project). The
fifteen trial types (A, B, C, X, Y, AB, AC, AX, AY, BC, BX, BY, CX, CY and XY) were
presented  twice  within  each  epoch  (again  to  counterbalance  the  left-right  cue
configurations), and in a random order. 
Procedure and analysis
The procedure and analysis for Experiment 9 was the same as for Experiment 8 apart
from two minor changes. Firstly, the instructions before the Test Stage were adjusted to
reflect the fact the there would be compound trials as well as single cue trials:
Now, your task is to judge the probability with which specific foods cause stomach ache
in your patient. Both single foods and pairs of two different kinds of food will be shown
to you on the screen.
In this part of the experiment, you will receive no feedback about the actual reaction of
the patient. Use the information that you have collected so far, to make your rating.
Press space bar to continue the experiment
Secondly, the results of  Uengoer et al. (2013) were selected for the specification of a
plausible predicted effect size for the Bayesian t-test. The mean difference from the first
test stage of their Experiment 2 was chosen, because participants received equivalent
training and testing to the current experiment. 
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Results and Discussion
The  trial-level  raw  data  and  analysis  script  for  this  experiment  are  available  at
https://osf.io/9vaby/. The descriptive statistics for the Experiment 9 training stage are
shown in Figure 20. The data indicate that participants learned sufficiently about the
four different trial types by the time Stage 1 was complete.
Figure 20. Experiment 9 training data
Descriptive statistics for the Experiment 9 Test Stage are shown in Figures 22 and 23,
along with the model fitting data (see next section). Ratings for X were significantly
higher than for Y; t(39) = 2.69, p = .011, BF = 18.87, d = 0.43, indicating a successful
demonstration of the redundancy effect. Figure 21 shows inter-subject variability on the
key test difference. Despite the mean difference between X and Y, the variability on the
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X-Y difference extended to a number of participants assigning a higher rating to Y than
they did to X. 
Figure 21. Inter-subject variability on the key X-Y difference.
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4.3.3: Redundancy effect model fitting details
The code for producing the model fitting outputs is available at  https://osf.io/9vaby/.
The  model  fitting  process  conducted  on  the  redundancy  effect  data  used  the  same
methodology as with the blocking data. 
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Results from standard model implementations
Table 8 shows the best fitting parameters, error and adequacy of fit for the unmodified
implementations of both models. The Rescorla-Wagner model performed better in this
instance, although the adequacy of fit is still lower than what would be expected from a
well performing model, as outlined in the blocking section of this chapter. Issues with
the fit for both models can be seen in the predicted versus observed test data. 
Table 8. Output of unmodified model fitting on redundancy effect data
Model LR
Init
Assoc
Beta Theta SSE
Mean
Error
R2
BM (standard) 0.12 N/A 0.64 3.17 0.52 0.05 0.62
RW (standard) 0.45 N/A 0.34 3.09 0.24 0.03 0.83
Figure 22 shows the predicted versus observed test data for the unmodified Rescorla-
Wagner, and Bush and Mosteller models. Crucially, the unmodified Rescorla-Wagner
model is not able to capture the redundancy effect (X > Y), as anticipated. The Bush and
Mosteller model is able to capture the redundancy effect itself, but does not provide an
adequate account of the test data as a whole. 
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Figure  22.  Predicted  versus  observed  Test  stage  ratings  for  unmodified  Rescorla-
Wagner (RW) model, and Bush & Mosteller (BM) model, against observed data (Obs),
following A+ AX+ BY+ CY- training. The violin plot represents the distribution of the
observed data.
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Results from modified model implementations
Table  9  shows shows the  best  fitting  parameters,  error  and adequacy of  fit  for  the
modified  implementations  of  both  models.  The  modified  implementation  of  the
Rescorla-Wagner  model  produced  less  error  and  a  better  adequacy  of  fit  than  the
unmodified  implementation,  while  the  modified  implementation  of  the  Bush  and
Mosteller  model was no better  than the unmodified implementation at  capturing the
experimental  data.  This  indicates  that  the  modified  Rescorla-Wagner  model  is  not
performing better  simply as a consequence of over fitting,  from the inclusion of an
additional free parameter for the starting associative strength.
Table 9. Output of modified model fitting on redundancy effect data
Model LR
Init
Assoc
Beta Theta SSE
Mean
Error
R2
BM (modified) 0.14 -0.34 0.57 3.03 0.51 0.05 0.63
RW (modified) 0.26 0.62 0.44 3.58 0.05 0.02 0.96
Importantly,  these data indicate that the modified Rescorla-Wagner model  is  a good
account of the dataset, while the modified Bush and Mosteller model provides a rather
poor account, with no discernible improvement on the unmodified model. Figure 23
shows the predicted versus observed test data for the modified Rescorla-Wagner, and
Bush and Mosteller, models. The modified Rescorla-Wagner model is able to capture
the redundancy effect, although the size of the effect is somewhat underestimated. It is
worth noting  that  the modified  Bush and Mosteller  model  can  also account  for  the
redundancy effect itself, but not the full set of test data.
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Figure 23. Predicted versus observed Test stage ratings for modified Rescorla-Wagner
(RW)  model,  and  Bush  &  Mosteller  (BM)  model,  against  observed  data  (Obs),
following A+ AX+ BY+ CY- training. The violin plot represents the distribution of the
observed data.
132
As with  the  blocking simulation,  the  best  fitting  initial  associative  strength  was  an
intermediate value. It is notable that the value was slightly higher than for the blocking
data. This could be because the outcome base rate during training (i.e. the proportion of
trial  types  resulting  in  stomach ache versus  no stomach ache)  was higher.  There  is
evidence  from Jones  et  al.  (2019)  that  participants’ causal  ratings  of  cues  they  are
uncertain  about  are  sensitive  to  the  outcome base  rate.  If  the  value  of  the  starting
associative strengths is an adequate way of representing uncertainty about the causal
status of novel cues, then the best fitting starting associative strength should change in
line with the outcome base rate. It is possible to test this idea by model fitting on a
dataset in which the outcome base rate has been experimentally manipulated. This was
the basis of the final model fitting procedure.
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4.4: Model fitting 3: redundancy effect base rate 
manipulation
A suitable dataset was already available for the final model fitting procedure. Jones et
al. (2019) reported a redundancy effect experiment, in which the outcome base rate was
varied between two different groups of human participants. Full experimental details are
available in their paper and a brief summary is included below. The test stage likelihood
ratings assigned to blocked cues were shown to vary in line with the outcome base rate,
on the basis of participants being uncertain about the causal status of these cues. In both
groups,  the redundancy effect was observed,  because blocked cue (X) was assigned
higher ratings than the uncorrelated cue (Y). However, the rating for X was higher in the
high base rate group. Consequently, the redundancy effect was larger when the base rate
was higher. The manipulation was achieved by adding additional cues, so that either
25% or  75% of  training  trials  resulted  in  stomach ache.  To test  the  prediction  that
starting associative strength is sensitive to experimental base rate, this parameter was
allowed  to  vary  by  condition  in  the  model  fitting  procedure.  None  of  the  other
parameters were allowed to vary by condition. If correct, the modified Rescorla-Wagner
model should provide a good fit to all the test cues for both groups, with a higher best
fitting initial associative strength in the 75% group than in the 25% group. As with the
previous simulations, the training and test cues used for the model fitting were identical
to the training and test cues experienced by the human participants. The fitting code for
this simulation is available at https://osf.io/fh3gc/.
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4.4.2: Base rate experimental details
The full details for this experiment are available in  Jones et al. (2019). The trial-level
raw data  for  this  experiment  is  available  at  https://osf.io/fh3gc/.  The  design  of  the
experiment  is  shown in  Table  10.  In  this  design,  there  are  additional  cues  that  are
unrelated to the basic redundancy effect trial types (A+ AX+ BY+ CY-).
Table 10. The design of the Jones et al. (2019) redundancy effect base rate experiment
Stage 1 (75%) Stage 1 (25%) Test
          D+  
          E+  
A+     F-   
AX+  GH+  
BY+   IJ+    
CY-    KL+  
          MN+ 
          OP-   
          D-
          E-
A+     F-
AX+  GH-
BY+   IJ-
CY-    KL-
          MN-
          OP-
A   
B   
C   
X   
Y   
Jones et al. (2019) predicted that that if participants are uncertain about the causal status
of a cue, then they should assign their causal rating based on the overall frequency of
the  outcome.  For  example,  if  most  training  trials  result  in  stomach  ache,  then
participants should assign higher causal ratings to such cues, as it is more likely that the
outcome will occur than not. They predicted that this between group difference would
be observed for the blocked cue X but not the uncorrelated cue Y, since participants
should be  uncertain  about  the former  but  not  the  latter.  The results  showed a clear
difference between the two groups, with a larger redundancy effect in the 75% group
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compared to the 25% group. As predicted, the blocked cue ratings appeared to be labile,
whilst the uncorrelated cue ratings were not.
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4.4.3: Base rate model fitting details
The code for producing the model fitting is available at https://osf.io/fh3gc/. The model
fitting  process  conducted  on  the  redundancy  effect  base  rate  data  used  the  same
methodology as with the Experiment 8 blocking data and the Experiment 9 redundancy
effect data. Unlike the previous datasets, the base rate data was taken from a between-
groups experiment. The best fitting parameters again had to be the same across both
groups, apart from the initial associative strength, since there was a theoretical reason
for  expecting this  to  vary in line with the different  base rates  in  each experimental
group. 
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Results from modified model implementation
The best  fitting  parameters,  error  and adequacy of  fit  are  reported  in  Table  11.  As
predicted the best fitting initial associative strength was higher in the high base rate
group than in the low base rate group. 
Table 11. Output of modified Rescorla-Wagner model fitting on redundancy effect base
rate data
LR
Init Assoc
(High)
Init Assoc
(Low)
Beta Theta SSE
Mean
Error
R2
(Low)
R2
(High)
0.030 0.513 0.385 0.356 8.204 0.026 0.032 0.976 0.983
The modified Rescorla-Wagner model produced low error and an equivalently good fit
in  both  the  25%  and  75%  base  rate  groups.  As  predicted,  the  best  fitting  initial
associative strength was higher in the high base rate group than in the low base rate
group. The initial associative strength parameter thus appears to provide one reasonable
way of representing participants’ uncertainty about the causal status of novel cues. Of
course, real participants, unlike these simulations, need to experience at least a few trials
in  order  to  become  sensitive  to  the  outcome  base  rate.  Thus,  using  initial  starting
weights to model the effects of outcome base rate is necessarily a simplification of the
mental operations involved. Figure 24 shows the predicted versus observed Test stage
ratings for the 25% and 75% base rate groups. The modified Rescorla-Wagner model
was able to capture the redundancy effect in both conditions. The model was also able
to capture the labile nature of the blocked cue X, although the effect of the base rate on
X is slightly underestimated.
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Figure 24. Predicted versus observed Test stage ratings for modified Rescorla-Wagner
(RW) model, against observed data (Obs), fitting to the high (h) and low (l) base rate
groups, following A+ AX+ BY+ CY- training (intermixed with additional cues used to
manipulate the base rate). The violin plot represents the distribution of the observed
data.
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4.5: General Discussion
The assumption that associative strengths start at zero, in humans, is not necessarily
correct.  In  fact,  this  assumption  may  be  wrong  in  many  common  experimental
scenarios. Allowing the initial associative strength to be an intermediate value provides
a simple but effective way of formally representing participants’ uncertainty about the
causal status of novel cues. Contrary to intuition, the unmodified Rescorla and Wagner
(1972)  model  provides  no  better  an  account  of  a  standard  forward  cue-competition
blocking  experiment  than  the  Bush  and  Mosteller  (1951)  model.  However,  if  the
Rescorla-Wagner model is modified, such that the initial associative strength of cues can
be an intermediate value, then it does provide a better account than the equivalently
modified Bush and Mosteller model. As stated in the chapter introduction (4.1), fitting
models to whole experiments is important, because even though models might predict
extracted parts of the experimental data, they should really be able to account for the
full experimental data. The modified Rescorla-Wagner model is also able to adequately
account for the redundancy effect  (e.g.  Uengoer et  al,  2013),  which the unmodified
model cannot. In addition to capturing the effect itself, the modified model adequately
captured the full observed test data using a complex set of cues. Furthermore, the initial
associative strength of the simulated cues was shown to vary with the outcome base
rate. The base rate finding supports the suggestion that intermediate initial associative
strengths can be used to represent uncertainty about the causal status of novel cues. This
is consistent with the experimental findings of Jones et al. (2019), in that the likelihood
ratings assigned to cues with a uncertain causal status are influenced by the outcome
base rate.
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It is worth noting that Vogel and Wagner (2016) suggested an alternative modification
of the Rescorla-Wagner model that also accommodates the redundancy effect. In their
modification, common elements are added to the stimulus representation. While this
modification  has  been shown to  accommodate  the  basic  redundancy effect,  there  is
evidence that it cannot adequately account for the effect of varying the outcome base
rate on the redundancy effect (Jones et al., 2019). Nevertheless, further investigation of
both  modifications,  across  a  range of  phenomena,  would  be  a  fruitful  direction  for
future  research.  The importance  of  making broad relative  adequacy comparisons  of
models has been previously emphasised within the literature (Wills & Pothos, 2012;
Wills, O'Connell, Edmunds, & Inkster, 2017). Furthermore, it would be useful to know
whether  the initial  associative strength modification allows other learning models to
explain more phenomena in human learning. If this  were the case,  this modification
might need to be considered when developing future models of associative learning
applicable to humans.
Instead of model fitting to a redundancy effect dataset only incorporating five single
cues at test,  the fitting on the Experiment 9 data used an expanded set of test cues.
Given the high adequacy of fit (R2  value 0.96) observed for the modified Rescorla and
Wagner (1972) model, a further fitting procedure conducted on a dataset incorporating
only five single test cues could not produce a fit any worse than this. Whilst there is
some scope for the Bush and Mosteller (1951) model to produce a better fit with less
test cues, the best this could result in is both models producing a comparably good fit as
each other. In this scenario, the modified Rescorla-Wagner model would still provide
the  best  account  across  the  data  sets  considered  in  this  chapter.  It  was  therefore
concluded  that  it  would  not  be  worthwhile  to  conduct  an  additional  model  fitting
141
process on a redundancy effect dataset that only incorporates five single cues at test.
Instead, it could be useful for future predictive learning experiments, which are going to
be used for model fitting, to incorporate compounds at test, since this provides a more
diagnostic method of testing the relative adequacy of models.
The  simulations  reported  in  this  chapter  demonstrate  the  importance  of  formal
modelling, in that they show the capabilities of even very simple models can be hard to
informally predict (as demonstrated by the blocking simulations with the unmodified
models).  Of course,  informal  predictions  are  sometimes proven correct,  as  with the
redundancy  effect  simulation  using  the  unmodified  Rescorla-Wagner  model.
Nevertheless, these results clearly demonstrate the value of thoroughly investigating the
parameter space of formal models, and highlight the potential risks of relying solely on
informal  intuition.  Formal  simulations  are  becoming  more  common in  the  study of
human predictive learning, and have been well  established in related fields,  such as
category learning, for decades. One possible barrier to conducting model simulations is
the perceived high entry cost, and the apparent lack of a common open framework, in
which  models,  phenomena  and  simulations  can  be  easily  assessed  and  compared.
However,  options  are  available,  such  as  ALTSim  (Thorwart,  Schultheis,  König,  &
Lachnit, 2009). ALTSim does not allow for parameter space optimisation, but it does
allow  initial  associative  strengths  to  be  set  to  values  other  than  zero.  The  model
implementations reported in the current chapter used a free and open source package
called  catlearn  (Wills,  Dome,  Edmunds,  Honke,  Inkster,  Schlegelmilch,  &  Spicer,
2019), which is available to download in the open-source R environment (R Core Team,
2018). Catlearn includes a number of model implementations, including Rescorla and
Wagner  (1971),  Bush  and  Mosteller  (1951),  EXIT  (Kruschke,  2001),  and  COVIS
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(Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998). Catlearn is an extensible framework
and it is easy to add more models (by request or through distributed collaboration), and
to  contribute  to  the  project.  You  can  find  out  more  information  here:
https://ajwills72.github.io/catlearn/
The initial strength modification explored in this chapter is just one feature that might
be useful to incorporate into an associative learning model based on theory protection.
Indeed, the intermediate starting associative strength of novel cues in this chapter is
consistent with the intermediate ratings given to the novel cue at test in Experiment 4
(Chapter 3). Additionally, the concept of uncertainty about novel cues is analogous with
the idea of having low confidence (i.e. a weak theory) about cues with an ambiguous
causal status. Of course, not all cues with an ambiguous causal status will be assigned
intermediate causal ratings by participants. For example, Experiments 6 and 7 showed
participants  assigning  low  ratings  to  cues  with  an  ambiguous  status,  because  their
uncertainty  encompassed  a  restricted  range  of  possibilities  (i.e.  they  had  enough
information  to  learn  that  non-reinforced  cues  cannot  be  a  cause  of  the  outcome).
Furthermore,  the  theory  protection  account  appears  to  be  about  more  than  causal
confidence.  For  example,  Chapter  2  briefly  discussed  how  theory  protection  may
operate  when  there  is  no  difference  in  confidence  between  cues.  Also,  Chapter  3
introduced the idea of matched (i.e. consistent) causal statuses and outcomes in theory
protection.  The final  chapter  discusses  these  issues  in  greater  detail,  and sets  out  a
follow-up programme of research for developing theory protection into a formal model. 
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Chapter 5
5.1 Implications of the research findings
At  present,  there  is  enough  evidence  to  warrant  further  investigation  of  the  theory
protection  account.  The  results  of  the  three  experiments  reported  in  Chapter  2  are
incompatible with either individual (Bush & Mosteller, 1951) or overall (Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972) prediction error, also ruling out a hybrid of these (Rescorla, 2001) as an
explanation.  They  are  also  not  compatible  with  the  attentional  model  proposed  by
Pearce and Hall (1980). However, they could be accounted for by Mackintosh’s (1975)
attentional model. The results of the four experiments reported in Chapter 3 are also
inconsistent with a prediction error account. The first two experiments are explainable
according to Pearce and Hall’s, and Mackintosh’s attentional models, but the subsequent
two  experiments  were  not  consistent  with  either  of  these  models.  In  short,  theory
protection  is  the  only  account  considered  so  far  that  is  able  to  account  for  all  of
Experiments 1-7. Furthermore,  Experiment 7 demonstrated a difference in confidence
about  the causal status of cues that  is  consistent with theory protection. The theory
protection  account  is  also  consistent  with  learning during  Stage  2  of  Experiment  8
reported in Chapter 4. Recall that cue B from the feature positive control part of the
design was trained as a non-reinforced cue (B-) in Stage 1, before being placed in a
causal compound (BY+) in Stage 2. The higher likelihood rating assigned to Y than B at
test  is  consistent  with participants protecting their  theory about  B not  being causal.
Instead, participants attributed the outcome on BY+ trials to the novel cue Y. The design
of the other experiments used for model fitting, in Chapter 4, did not allow for any
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assessment  of  theory  protection,  because  there  was only  one  training  stage  in  each
experiment. 
Taken as a whole, the results of Experiments 1-8 provide evidence that theory protection
plays a prominent role in selectivity in human learning. That is, participants maintain
previously learned causal associations, instead attributing unexpected outcomes to cues
with a comparatively ambiguous status. Furthermore, the possible causal status range of
cues (on the basis of prior training), and whether subsequently encountered outcomes
match that causal status range, also appears to be central to theory protection. In the
current  experiments,  when two cues  were trained in  compound,  participants  always
learned more about the cue with the causal status range that matched the current trial
feedback (i.e. outcome). Conversely, participants protected their theory about the cue
with the causal status that did not match the current trial feedback. For example, at the
end of Experiment 6 Stage 1, the status of cue B following B- training could either have
been neutral or preventative (but not causal). Therefore when B was paired with causal
cue A (following A+ training) during Stage 2, in a non-reinforced compound AB-, the
status of cue B matched the current trial feedback. Note that an inhibitory cue would be
able to prevent A from causing the outcome. However, the status of A did not match the
Stage 2 feedback. To provide another example, at the end of Experiment 1 Stage 1, the
status  of the blocked cue X could have either  been causal  or non-causal,  while  the
uncorrelated cue Y should not have been considered a cause. Therefore the possible
status range of cue X matched the outcome during the XY+ trials, while the status of Y
did not. 
145
This principle applies to all of Experiments 1-8, because the cue that was learned about
the most in Stage 2 encompassed a range of possible causal statuses following Stage 1
training.  Part  of  this  range always matched with  the outcome that  was encountered
during  Stage  2.  This  range  was  a  consequence  of  the  experimental  manipulations
causing participants to lack confidence about the status of those cues. The cue that was
learned about the least in Stage 2 of experiments 1-8 always had a causal status that did
not match with the outcome encountered during Stage 2. However, as already outlined,
the theory protection account also makes predictions for designs in which there should
be no lack of confidence about the causal status of cues trained in compound. Therefore,
while the focus of these experiments has been on causal confidence, matching between
causal statuses and outcomes appears to be equally (if not more) important to theory
protection in associative learning. It is possible that causal ambiguity, and the resulting
lack  of  confidence  it  causes,  drives  learning  because  it  facilitates  matching.  Some
experiments intended to test these ideas are proposed in the next section of this chapter.
Contrary  to  what  one  might  assume  from a  prediction  error  account,  the  evidence
presented in this thesis shows that the cue with the greatest prediction error is often the
one  least  learned  about.  Instead,  it  appears  that  humans  resist  changing  strongly
held beliefs. People seem to attribute surprising outcomes to cues when they either lack
a strong theory about that cue, or when the theory they do hold matches the surprising
outcome. In other words, when protecting their theories about cues, humans should look
for alternative causes that might provide a better explanation of the outcome, such as
cues  with  a  lower  prediction error. Despite  the  apparent  inconsistency  between  a
prediction  error  account  and  the  results  of  the  present  experiments,  the  idea  that
prediction  error  influences  learning should not  be dismissed  in  its  entirety.  Broadly
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speaking,  learning  seems  to  be  dependent  on  there  being  a  discrepancy  between
predicted  outcomes  and  actual  outcomes.  In  the  theory  protection  account,  this
‘surprise’ may still dictate whether learning takes place, and how much learning there
will  be.  Meanwhile,  the  theories  that  people  develop (and which  they  subsequently
protect) about the causal status of cues may dictate which cues are learned about, in
order  to  predict  future  events  more  accurately.  All  of  Experiments  1-8  introduce  a
surprising outcome (or a surprising outcome omission). For example, in the Chapter 3
experiments, a previously causal cue and an ambiguous cue were paired in a non-causal
compound  in  Stage  2.  In  each  of  these  experiments,  the  discrepancy  between  the
stomach ache predicted by A,  following Stage  1,  and the  absence of  stomach ache
following the Stage 2 AB- compound presumably led to learning about B. It is likely
that, in the absence of surprise, no learning would have taken place. This is an important
point to consider for the purpose of developing a formal model of theory protection in
associative learning. 
Chapter 4 investigated uncertainty; specifically, how uncertainty about novel cues could
be  represented  within  learning  models.  The  results  from  a  set  of  model  fitting
simulations challenge the assumption that the associative strength of cues should start at
zero in human learning. This assumption appears to be incorrect in at least some human
predictive  learning  tasks.  Future  simulations  of  human  learning  could  benefit  from
setting the  initial  associative strength  of  cues  to  an intermediate  value,  to  represent
participants’ lack of confidence about the causal status of cues  not yet encountered.
Making this modification to a simple learning model (i.e. Rescorla and Wagner, 1972)
allows  it  to  accommodate  more  phenomena  than  the  unmodified  model;  a  simple
blocking experiment, the redundancy effect, and the effect of outcome base rate on the
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redundancy  effect. Further  investigation  of  the  starting  associative  strength
modification, across a wide range of models and phenomena, would be a useful next
step  in  representing  uncertainty  in  the  modelling  of  human  learning.  It  may  be
appropriate  for future models of human learning to incorporate  this  parameter. This
could include any potential future model of theory protection in associative learning.
A formal  model  of  theory protection would need to  represent  the range of possible
causal statuses that a cue might encompass. For example, a blocked cue could be causal
or neutral, but not inhibitory. A non-reinforced cue could be either neutral or inhibitory,
but not causal. A cue where the outcome is concealed could have any status, assuming
this  is  permitted  by  the  experimental  scenario.  Meanwhile,  a  reinforced cue  that  is
trained in isolation could be causal, but could not have any other status. A model of
theory protection would also need a process to calculate which cues are learned about
across  a  wide  range  of  experimental  designs.  This  would  require  the  mathematical
representation of matching between the causal status (or causal status range) of cues and
subsequently experienced outcomes. Finally, the amount of learning would also need to
be  calculated.  This  last  point  is  perhaps  the  most  straightforward,  as  this  would
presumably be calculated from a form of overall prediction error. As outlined above,
some kind of discrepancy between predicted and experienced outcomes should still be
needed for learning to take place. The causal status range of cues could be achieved by
having an upper and lower bound to associative strengths, representing the limits of
what causal status a cue could have. For example, a cue where the outcome is concealed
would have a range encompassing all causal statuses; an upper bound of one, and a
lower bound of minus one. A non-reinforced cue would have an upper bound of zero
and a lower bound of minus one.  Meanwhile,  a cue with an unambiguously known
148
status would have an upper and lower bound at the same associative strength value.
Importantly, because ambiguous cues are subsequently trained in compounds, in which
their causal status can be ascertained, the upper and lower bound would reduce on a
trial-by-trial basis. The representation of matching is a little less clear at this stage, but it
might  involve  subtracting  the  associative  strength  value  of  an experienced outcome
from all possible values within the associative strength range of a cue. For example, if
this calculation produces a value of zero during such a process, then this could be a
condition under which that cue is learned about. Of course, these suggestions are highly
speculative at this stage. 
The Bayesian approach to associative learning (e.g. Kruschke, 2008) outlined in the 
introduction could also provide a way of implementing the types of processes suggested
above. The belief distribution used to represent the status of cues may provide a logical 
way of capturing the causal status ranges described above. Additionally, the weighting 
of competing hypotheses (about the status of cues) could provide a way for beliefs 
about ambiguous cues to update faster than beliefs about cues with a causal status that is
more confidently known. In other words, existing cue-outcome associations could be 
protected if participants have a high degree of confidence, in circumstances where cues 
are trained together in compounds. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a model using this 
approach would need learning to be cue-governed, rather than outcome-governed. 
Before attempting to construct a testable formal model, using one of the approaches 
suggested, it is necessary to conduct further experiments to investigate some of the 
additional processes that may underpin theory protection. 
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Before  outlining  follow-up experimental  designs,  there  are  some further  points  that
briefly require discussion. For example, the findings in Experiments 6 and 7 were the
opposite of those found in rats and pigeons by Rescorla (2001). Moreover, the findings
of Experiments 1-8 were the opposite of the results predicted by the Rescorla (2001)
account. This suggests that further comparative studies between humans and non-human
animals  would  be  valuable.  The  issue  of  whether  a  comparable  process  to  theory
protection occurs in non-human animals needs addressing. At present, it is tempting to
conclude that there is no such process in rats and pigeons, on the basis of Rescorla’s
results. However, many of the experimental designs reported in this thesis were different
to those conducted by Rescorla. It is therefore possible that close replications of the
designs reported here, using non-human animals, would produce equivalent results to
humans. Furthermore, it is possible that other species of animals do in fact learn in a
way that is more human-like, with respect to theory protection. Of course, such inter-
species differences may not be as straightforward as they initially seem. For example,
there is already some evidence (i.e. Experiments 6 and 7 from this thesis compared with
Haselgrove  and  Evans,  2010)  that  humans  learn  more  like  rats  and  pigeons  if  the
scenario is appropriately manipulated.
Attention has not been totally ruled out in explaining the current set of results.  The
potential role of attention could be further tested by examining overt attention to cues
during  training.  It  should  be  possible  to  detect  whether  there  is  a  difference  in  the
attention paid to the cues at the start of Stage 2 (in Experiments 1-8) by tracking eye
movements. Furthermore, if there is a rapid shift in attention from one cue to another
during Stage 2, it should also be possible to detect this from eye-tracking. It may be that
both theory protection and attention have a role to play in human associative learning,
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rather  than these processes  being  mutually  exclusive.  For  example,  it  could  be that
matching (between cue status and outcome) and variations  in confidence (about the
causal  status  of  cues)  result  in  differences  in  the  attention  paid  to  such  cues.
Furthermore,  even  if  attention  correlates  with  learning,  it  may  not  govern  it.  Both
learning and attention could be driven by the theories people hold about cues, on the
basis of the information available to them while they learn.
In summary, the findings in humans reported here have three potential implications: that
the learning mechanisms responsible for rat behaviour might be different to those found
in humans; that the modelling of human behaviour may require the development of a
new theory; that the operation of prediction error (as currently conceptualised) might
need  modifying.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  proposes  a  further  programme  of
research  investigating  the  cognitive  processes  and  mechanisms  required  to  explain
theory  protection  in  human  associative  learning.  The  findings  from these  proposed
experiments will aid in the development of a new model of learning.
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5.2: Towards a formal model of theory protection
Further experimental investigation of theory protection in human learning is required,
so that a formal model can be developed. At present,  an informal account has been
proposed, in which humans (unlike certain non-human animals) resist updating existing
cue-outcome associations as much as possible, when faced with surprising outcomes. In
order to turn this informal account into a formal theory, it is necessary to further unpack
the cognitive processes underpinning theory protection in human associative learning.
There are several avenues for future research that will achieve this aim. 
The  experiments  presented  in  Chapter  3  show  participants  learning  more  about  an
ambiguous cue than an unambiguous cue, when both are trained in a compound that is
not causal. It appears that the ambiguous cue is learned about more because the range of
causal  statuses  it  could  encompass  at  the  end  of  Stage  1  matches  the  outcome
experienced during Stage 2. In each experiment, it was possible that the ambiguous cue
(B-)  was  an  inhibitor.  The  combination  of  the  cues  and  the  outcome  during  the
compound stage (AB-) was sufficient for participants to learn that B was an inhibitor
with a strong degree of confidence. The next step is to further test how this generalises.
For example, will this effect work in the opposite direction, so that participants learn
more about a cue that might be causal and protect their theory about a known inhibitor?
The reason for suggesting an inhibitory cue is  that an unambiguous inhibitor  is  the
causal  opposite  of  an  unambiguous  excitor.  This  could  be  tested  in  a  series  of
experiments  that  mirrors  the  three  basic  designs  used  in  Chapter  3  (note  that
Experiments  6  and  7  are  effectively  the  same design).  The  first  experiment  would
therefore contain an inhibitor trained in a causal compound with a novel cue, mirroring
the causal cue trained in a non-causal compound with a novel cue in Experiment 4. The
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subsequent experiments would follow the same logic, except that the second experiment
would use a concealed-outcome cue and the third experiment would use a blocked cue.
In the case of a blocked cue, this could either be causal or neutral, but not inhibitory,
which  is  the  opposite  of  a  non-reinforced  cue  (which  could  either  be  neutral  or
inhibitory, but not causal). 
Table 12. Design of three experiments to test the generalisability of theory protection
Experiment Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
A A+  C+  AM-  CN- MB+ NB  MD 
A  B  C  D  N  M
B A+  C+  AM-  CN-
B?   D?
MB+ NB  MD 
A  B  C  D  N  M
C A+  C+  AM-  CN-
E+  EB+  F+  FD+
MB+ NB  MD 
A  B  C  D  E  F  N  M
Key:
Letters = different cues
+ = outcome
- = no outcome
? = outcome concealed from participants
In  the  Table  12  experimental  designs,  participants  should  learn  more  about  the
ambiguous  cue  B  according  to  theory  protection,  but  should  learn  more  about  the
inhibitor  M  according  to  a  prediction  error  account  (e.g.  Rescorla,  2001).  This  is
because Cue M would be most  discrepant  with the Stage  2 outcome.  According to
Mackintosh (1975), cue M would also have the higher associability at the start of Stage
2  in  each  of  the  above  designs  (assuming  that  novelty  does  not  result  in  higher
associability in Experiment A). This is because M would be a good predictor of the
absence of the outcome. The theory protection account predicts more learning about B,
on the basis of participants protecting their belief that M is preventative of the outcome
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in  each design.  Logically,  participants  should  learn  that  B is  a  strong cause  of  the
outcome (i.e. B should become superconditioned), in order to overcome an inhibitor.
The aforementioned results of Le Pelley and McLaren (2001) showed more learning
about a causal cue than an inhibitor, in a comparable design, although their experiment
did not incorporate any causal ambiguity.
A current  gap  in  the  understanding  of  theory  protection  concerns  extinction  and
reacquisition.  In typical prediction error models, learning is represented as starting off
fast for cues that are trained as causal, assuming an initial associative strength of zero
(although this associative strength assumption may be wrong in humans as indicated by
the findings of Chapter 4).  As the prediction error reduces,  learning slows until  the
asymptote of learning is  reached.  If  those same cues  are subsequently extinguished,
learning should again start off fast and then slow down as extinction reaches asymptote.
If those cues are then re-trained as causal, learning should once again start off fast and
become slower. However, if participants engage in theory protection, then they should
initially resist updating the associative strength of cues with a known status. This initial
resistance to updating would obviously not apply to cues being trained for the first time,
but it would apply to any subsequent extinction and re-acquisition. According to theory
protection,  learning should start  off  slow, become faster as the current theory about
those cues is released, and then slow down again as learning reaches asymptote. Recall
the Chapter 1 example of watching a disappointing new season of a previously brilliant
TV show,  for  an  everyday  example  of  how  such  a  process  could  manifest.  Your
prediction  about  the  quality  of  subsequent  episodes  would  change rapidly  from the
outset according to a prediction error account, but you would resist such initial rapid
change in your predictions, according to the theory protection account. The design in
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Table 13 outlines a possible way of detecting such a learning pattern. As before, the use
of  compounds  is  intended  to  overcome  the  potential  non-linear  mapping  between
associative strength and responding. Four cues are trained as causing an outcome (e.g.
happiness)  in  Stage  1.  Two of  those  cues  (B and D)  are  then  trained as  causing  a
mutually exclusive outcome on the same scale (e.g. sadness) in Stage 2. Cue B is then
trained, along with cue A, in a compound that causes this second outcome, in Stage 3. If
learning starts off slow and then speeds up, this should result in more learning about B
than A in Stage 3 (assuming the rate of learning is not so fast that learning about B nears
completion  in  Stage  2).  Consequently,  BD should  be  rated  sadder  than  AC at  test
according  to  this  conceptualisation  of  theory  protection.  However,  according  to  a
prediction error account, AC should be rated sadder.
Table 13. Extinction/reacquisition experimental design
Experiment Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Test
D A-O1  B-O1  C-O1  D-O1 B-O2  D-O2 AB-O2 AC  BD
A  B  C  D
Key:
Letters = different cues
O1 = outcome 1
O2 = outcome 2
As already noted, the experiments presented in this thesis predominantly focused on
differences in confidence about the status of cues, but matching between the status of
cues and subsequent outcomes needs further investigation. For example, more needs to
be  understood  about  situations  in  which  there  is  no  difference  in  participants’
confidence about the status of cues trained in compound. Participants might be equally
confident  about  two  cues,  but  the  theory  protection  account  should  still  make
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predictions about which cue will be learned about the most, on the basis of existing
causal  knowledge.  A useful  starting  point  might  be  to  replicate  the  Le  Pelley  and
McLaren (2001) experiment described near the end of Chapter 2. This experiment has
not yet been replicated and there were only 20 participants. As a useful follow up to this,
two additional experiments using novel designs are outlined in Table 14. As before, the
outcomes (O1 and O2) would need to be mutually exclusive.
Table 14. Design of two experiments investigating matching
Experiment Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
E A-O1  B-O2  C-O1  D-O2 AB-O1 AC  BD
A  B  C  D
F XA-O1  YB-O2  XC-O1  YD-O2
X-O1     Y-O2
AB-O1 AC  BD
A  B  C  D  X  Y
Key:
Letters = different cues
O1 = outcome 1
O2 = outcome 2
In  Experiment  E,  the  design  tests  for  matching  influencing  selectivity  in  learning.
Confidence about the causal status of the cues should not differ at the end of Stage 1, so
that participants are equally confident about the status of A and B. During Stage 2, the
previously  learned  status  of  A matches  the  outcome  that  is  trained  with  the  AB
compound, but the previously learned status of B does not match. Participants should
therefore protect their theory about B, instead learning more about A and assigning a
rating  that  reflects  this  to  AC at  test.  According  to  a  prediction  error  account,  the
opposite result should be seen, as the associative strength of B would be most discrepant
with the outcome during Stage 2. One possible flaw with this design is that it may not
be possible for the associative strength of A to increase any more (during Stage 2) if
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learning is  at  asymptote.  This could be overcome by presenting a stronger  outcome
during Stage 2. Experiment F follows the same logic, except that participants should
have an equal lack of confidence about the causal status of both A and B following
Stage 1. Cues A and B are both blocked cues and are therefore causally ambiguous from
the  perspective  of  participants  (Jones  et  al.,  2019).  As before,  cue A has  the  better
matched outcome during Stage 2, so according to the theory protection account there
should be more learning about A, assuming matching is important to learning. 
The two experimental designs in Table 14 raise a follow-up question about which of
matching  or  confidence  is  the  most  important  aspect  of  theory  protection.  In
Experiments  1-8,  the cue  with the  matched outcome was also the  one about  which
participants were least confident, which makes it  impossible to answer that question
from  these  datasets.  The  two  designs  in  Table  15  effectively  pit  confidence  and
matching against each other,  in order to address this issue. In Experiment G, causal
ambiguity  is  maximal  for  cues  C  and  F  in  both  groups,  because  the  outcome  is
concealed  during  Stage  1.  In  Group 1,  A is  better  matched than  C in  Stage  2,  but
participants should be less confident about C than A after Stage 1. Therefore, according
to matching, there should be more learning about A during Stage 2, but according to
confidence, there should be more learning about C. In Group 2, C is better matched than
A during Stage 2 (and also more ambiguous), but A would have the greater prediction
error. Therefore, according to matching there should be more learning about C. In short,
if confidence is dominant, then C should be learned about most during Stage 2, in both
groups.  However,  if  matching is  dominant,  then A should be learned about most in
Group 1, while C should be learned about most in Group 2.
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Table 15. Testing matching against confidence in theory protection
Experiment Stage 1 Stage 2
(Group 1)
Stage 2
(Group 2)
Test
G A-O1  B-O2  C-?  
D-O1  E-O2  F-?
AC-O1 AC-O2 AF  DC
H A+  B-  C+  D- AB+ AB- AC  BD
Key:
Letters = different cues
O1 = outcome 1
O2 = outcome 2
+ = outcome
- = no outcome
? = outcome concealed from participants
Experiment H follows a similar logic, except that causal ambiguity is across a more
restricted range for cues B and D, because participants can at least learn that these cues
are not causal during Stage 1. In Group 1, A has the matched outcome during Stage 2,
while B has the most ambiguous status at the end of Stage 1. According to matching,
there should be more learning about A, but according to confidence (and prediction
error)  there should be more learning about  B. In Group 2,  B has both the matched
outcome and the most ambiguous status, while A would have the greater prediction
error. According to theory protection (both matching and confidence) there should be
more learning about B during Stage 2 (which of course has already been observed in
Experiments 6 and 7 in this thesis).
The Mitchell et al. (2008) experiment described in Chapter 2 is of some relevance to the
relationship between confidence and matching. Recall that a previously causal cue (A+)
and a novel cue (B) were subsequently trained in a causal compound (AB+) resulting in
evidence of more learning about the novel cue. Taken a face value, this result suggests
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that confidence is dominant over matching, since A was the better matched cue during
the  compound  training,  while  B  was  causally  ambiguous.  However,  the  range  of
outcomes that B could be, as a novel cue, includes the possibility of it being causal.
Therefore,  it  could  be argued that  both  A and B match.  Group 1 in  Experiment  H
overcomes  this  issue,  because  B  would  not  match  the  Stage  2  outcome,  as  a
consequence of it being non-reinforced in Stage 1. As for the novel cue being learned
about most in the Mitchell et al. design, it is possible that participants inferred B was
not  inhibitory  (even  if  it  could  still  have  been  either  neutral  or  causal)  following
feedback on Stage 2, since it would have prevented the outcome during this stage if so.
However,  the scenario used foods as the cues, so it  seems unlikely that participants
would have considered that B might be inhibitory in the first place. Furthermore, the
presence of a prediction error to drive learning during the compound stage is unclear.
Cue A already predicted the outcome during the first training stage, so the occurrence of
the outcome during the compound stage should not be surprising, although participants
might  over-predict  the  outcome,  setting  up  a  negative  prediction  error.  Whilst  the
Mitchell  et  al.  result  seems  broadly  consistent  with  theory  protection,  the  exact
mechanism of operation is hard to identify. The other experiments proposed here should
hopefully allow for some clarity. It may be that neither matching nor confidence are
dominant, and that other factors might guide which of these processes drives theory
protection across different experimental designs.
The Chapter 3 discussion (3.6) raised the point of what would happen in cases where it
is  not possible for participants to protect their  existing theories about cues.  In other
words, what happens in cases where something must have changed? One possibility is
that learning would resemble individual prediction error, although this learning may be
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slow at first if participants resist updating their beliefs. Again, think back to the example
of a disappointing new season of a previously brilliant TV show, for a simple real-life
example of when something must have changed. Another way of framing this, in the
context of compound learning experiments, is to consider what would happen when the
status of neither cue in a compound matches an experienced outcome. The experimental
designs in Table 16 will allow this to be tested.
Table 16. Design of two experiments investigating learning when theory protection is
not possible.
Experiment Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
I A+  AX-  Y-
B+  BW-  Z-
XY+ XZ  WY
J A+  AX-  Y-  AY+
B+  BW-  Z-  BZ+
XY+ XZ  WY
Key:
Letters = different cues
+ = outcome
- = no outcome
In Experiment I, neither X nor Y match the outcome during Stage 2, since X is trained
as an inhibitor during Stage 1, while Y is non-reinforced. Y is more causally ambiguous,
but participants should have learned that it is not a cause of the outcome during Stage 1,
even if it might be either neutral or inhibitory. Therefore, this difference in confidence
between cues X and Y should not result in more learning about Y, if one assumes that
matching  is  integral  to  theory  protection.  Meanwhile  X  will  have  an  unambiguous
causal status following Stage 1. If participants are unable to protect their theory about
either  X or  Y,  then  it  is  possible  that  there  will  be  more  learning about  X than Y
(resembling individual prediction error), as participants are forced to release their theory
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about X being inhibitory.  Of course, it  is also possible that participants would learn
about both cues equally (resembling overall prediction error). Experiment J follows the
same logic, except that Y and Z are both unambiguously trained as neutral cues, thus
removing any lack  of  confidence  about  their  causal  status  as  a  variable  that  might
govern learning. It  should be noted in these designs, that Y is  arguably the ‘closer’
matched cue in Stage 2, so if there was more learning about Y than X, then that is
perhaps one possible interpretation of such a result. However, neither cue should be an
adequate  match,  so  theory  protection  (as  defined  in  this  thesis)  should  still  not  be
possible. 
Another possible design mentioned in the Chapter 3 discussion (3.6) is included in full,
in Table 17. Similarly to Experiments I and J, this experiment is intended to test what
will happen if participants are unable to protect existing theories. In Group 1, B is a
blocked cue, while in Group 2, the design from Experiment 6 is replicated, so that B is
non-reinforced. Theory protection should not be possible in Group 1, because a blocked
cue cannot be inhibitory, otherwise the outcome would not be observed on the EB+
trials. Therefore, unlike Group 2, there should not be greater learning about B than A
during Stage 2 in Group 1. 
Table 17. Design of experiment investigating learning when theory protection is not
possible
Experiment Stage 1 (Group 1) Stage 1 (Group 2) Stage 2 Test
K A+  C+  
E+  EB+  F+  FD+
A+  C+  B-  D- AB- AD  BC
Key:
Letters = different cues
+ = outcome
- = no outcome
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The Chapter 3 discussion (3.6) also suggested a between-groups experiment, intended to
unpack the differences between the theory protection account and the Pearce and Hall
(1980) attentional model. The design is included in full, in Table 18. In Group 1, the
design of Experiment 6 is replicated, but with an extra pre-training stage containing
some  filler  cues.  In  Group  2,  B-  is  explicitly  pre-trained  as  inhibitory.  The  theory
protection account predicts a lower rating for BC in Group 1, but no difference between
the test compounds in Group 2, resulting in a between-group interaction. Pearce and
Hall’s model predicts no difference between the groups because all cues should decline
in associability equally before Stage 2. This is because the outcome should be equally
predictable on all trials. 
Table 18. Design of experiment investigating theory protection and Pearce and Hall
(1980) attentional model
Experiment Pre-Train
(Group1)
Pre-Train
(Group2)
Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
L P+  Q+  
R-  S-
P+  Q+ 
PB-  PD-
A+  C+  B-  D- AB- AD  BC
Key:
Letters = different cues
+ = outcome
- = no outcome
Finally,  the  Chapter  3  discussion  (3.6)  suggested  that  theory  protection  could  be
ameliorated by manipulating the scenario between food-allergy and chemical-allergy.
As stated, there is already some indirect evidence that theory protection is dependent on
people’s  assumptions  about  the scenario (i.e.  Haselgrove and Evans (2010) findings
versus the results of Experiment 6 in Chapter 3).  In short,  the food-allergy scenario
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appears  to  restrict  the  type  of  learning  that  can  occur,  because  participants  do  not
generally assume that foods can become inhibitory (also supported by Zaksaite & Jones,
2019). This idea relates back to matching. In the Haselgrove and Evans experiment,
matching between the non-reinforced cue from Stage 1 and the absence of the outcome
during Stage 2 should not have been possible, because the status of the non-reinforced
cue would not have extended to it potentially being an inhibitor (i.e. participants should
have learned that it was neutral with a high degree of confidence). Such assumptions
about the scenario could be regarded as another form of theory that people protect, in
spite of surprising outcomes. In order to protect such theories, participants would have
to release competing theories about the causal status of specific cues. The role of the
scenario would need to be investigated using between-groups experiments, in which one
group is given a chemical scenario and another group is given a food scenario. The three
designs from Chapter 3 (please see Table 2) would be suitable. 
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5.3: The basis of theory protection 
Whilst the focus of this thesis has mainly been on the processes underpinning theory
protection in human associative learning, there is also the question of what cognitive
basis such processes might have. If theory protection is unique to humans (which it
might not be), it may be that it relies on complex, abstract cognition, as opposed to a
low-level, automatic associative mechanism. If this were the case, then it would make
sense for such cognitive processes to be unique to humans, or at least unique to species
capable of more complex forms of cognition, such as primates, dolphins, or pigs (e.g.
Tomasello  & Call,  1994;  Herman,  2006;  Marino  & Colvin,  2015).  In  humans,  the
potential involvement of complex cognition in theory protection could be investigated
using cognitive load manipulations. The basic idea is that if participants are completing
a learning experiment in which theory protection appears to operate, then it should be
possible to ameliorate theory protection by giving participants a simultaneous task that
occupies their cognitive capacity. Such experiments would need to be between-groups,
with one group incorporating the cognitive load manipulation, and a control in which no
cognitive load is introduced. 
The three experimental designs in Chapter 3 would be suitable for a cognitive load
manipulation, as the effect seen across those experiments seems particularly robust. The
designs can be found in Table 2. There are several ways in which cognitive load can be
introduced to experimental procedures. For example, Wills, Graham, Koh, McLaren and
Rolland (2011),  and  Seabrooke,  Wills,  Hogarth,  and  Mitchell  (2019),  introduced
cognitive load by requiring participants to memorise numbers while completing learning
experiments. Abelson, Erickson, Mayer, Crocker, Briggs, Lopez-Duran, and Liberzon
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(2014) created cognitive load through stress, by requiring participants to prepare for
giving a talk. Other ways of creating cognitive load include adding a time constraint to
learning tasks, and asking participants to count backwards in intervals (e.g. Moghadam,
Ashayeri,  Salavati,  Sarafzadeh,  Taghipoor,  Saeedi,  & Salehi,  2011).  It  may  also  be
possible to introduce cognitive load through anxiety. For example, the inhalation of air
rich in carbon dioxide can be used to create a temporary state of anxiety in participants
(e.g. Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004).
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5.4: The development of theory protection
A final avenue for potential future research is investigating the development of theory
protection in learning, to find out at what stage humans begin protecting theories in this
way. This links with using cognitive load to investigate whether complex cognition is
involved,  because  children  develop specific  cognitive  abilities  at  different  stages  of
development, such as developing a theory of mind (Mitchell, 1997). This also links with
investigating the role of the scenario, because children under a certain age may not have
developed theories such as foods not being inhibitors of allergic reactions. Studying the
developmental trajectory of theory protection is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, it
could  tell  us  about  which  areas  of  the  brain  (and  which  cognitive  processes) are
important.  Secondly,  there  may  be  potential  applied  applications  for  this  kind  of
research, such as for teaching and education. Thirdly, it would be interesting to know if
humans start out ‘rat-like’, learning via low-level mechanisms, before gaining theory
protection as part  of a  suite  of more complex cognitive abilities.  A selection of the
experimental designs covered in this thesis could be adapted and given to children of
varying age groups, to test for evidence of theory protection. 
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5.5: Concluding statement
In conclusion, the product of this thesis is an informal account of theory protection in
human associative learning, based on a series of experiments that support this view. As
discussed, the findings of these experiments are irreconcilable with the predictions of
several major theories of associative learning. Additionally, this thesis proposes a simple
mathematical  way of  representing  human participants’ lack  of  confidence  about  the
causal  status  of  novel  cues  within  existing  models  of  associative  learning.  Future
research  into  theory  protection  should  use  a  combination  of  theory-driven
experimentation  and  formal  computational  model  fitting  to  test  these  ideas  further.
However, before any formal modelling of theory protection can be conducted, it is first
necessary to run some of the additional experiments covered in this chapter, so that a
testable  formal  model  of  theory  protection  in  human  associative  learning  can  be
developed. In particular, the experiments looking for evidence of matching, the role of
the  scenario,  and  the  generalisability  of  theory  protection  will  serve  this  purpose.
However, even in the absence of a formal model, the evidence for theory protection in
learning  is  compelling,  and  could  have  implications  for  future  associative  learning
research.  In  particular,  the  way  in  which  human  participants  appear  to  protect
associations from change should be of greater focus for future research in this field. 
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Addendum: equations for attentional models
According to Mackintosh’s (1975) attentional model, more attention is paid to cues that
are better predictors of outcomes, resulting in greater learning. Attention (represented as
associability) operates alongside individual prediction error. The equation is as follows:
∆Vx = Sαx(λ–VA)                                                                                         (4)
In Equation 4, S is the learning rate parameter and α is the associability. The associative
strength is denoted by V, where ∆Vx is the change in associative strength for cue X, and
Vx is the current associative strength of cue X. The asymptote of learning is represented
by λ.
According to Pearce and Hall’s (1980) attentional model, more attention is paid to cues
that are followed by surprising outcomes,  while cues that are followed by predicted
outcomes decline in associability. The equation is as follows:
∆Vx = Sαxλ                                                                                                  (5)
In  Equation  5,  S  is  the  learning  rate  parameter,  and  the  associability  of  cue  X  is
represented by αx. As before, ∆Vx is the change in associative strength for cue X, and λ
is the asymptote of learning. The associability is calculated by subtracting the sum of
the associative strengths on the previous trial from λ. 
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